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MARTIN MARIETTA V. LORENZ: PALPABLE PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE SUPERFLUOUS SIXTH ELEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, I recog-
nized on first impression a public policy exception in tort to the at-will
employment doctrine. 2 "[I]n keeping with the majority of jurisdic-
tions," and "within the framework" of prior Colorado case law,3 the
court adopted and extended the standard to establish a primafacie case
of wrongful discharge under the public policy exception as originally set
out by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural
Electric Association.4 Cronk I stated that an employee must prove a five
step prima facie case to qualify for an exception to the at-will employment
doctrine: (1) the employee refused to perform an action; (2) ordered by
the employer; (3) which would violate a specific statute; whose terms are
more than a broad general statement of policy; and (5) the employee's
termination resulted from the refusal to perform such action.5 Adding
to this Cronk I standard, the Lorenz court required an additional, sixth
element to establish a prima fade case-evidence showing that the em-
ployer was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the em-
ployee's refusal to perform the employer's directive was based on the
employee's reasonable belief that the employer's directive was illegal,
contrary to clear statutory policy relating to the employee's duty as a
citizen, or violative of the employee's legal rights or privileges as a
worker. 6 By adding this new employer knowledge element, the Lorenz
court ventures into a virtual frontier. No authority is cited by the court
1. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
2. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108.
3. Id
4. 765 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied (Cronk I), appeal after remand,
140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2149 (Colo. Ct. App. April 2, 1992), cert. denied (Cronk II).
5. Cronk I, 765 P.2d at 622. The Cronk I court interpreted Farmer v. Central Bancor-
poration, 761 P.2d 220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), which set a two-step test for exception to
the at-will employment doctrine, restricted to the facts of the case. The Farmer court held
that to gain employee protection of the public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine, the employee must establish that (1) the refusal to carry out the employer's di-
rective would constitute a statutory violation; and (2) the employee's discharge was a result
of the refusal to violate the statute. Farmer, 761 P.2d at 221.
6. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109. Under the new primafacie standard set out by the court,
the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the employer di-
rected the employee to perform an illegal act; (2) as part of the employee's work related
duties; or (3) prohibited the employee from performing a public duty, privilege or right;
(4) the employer's directive would violate a specific statute relating to the health, safety, or
welfare or undermine clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee's rights or
privileges as a citizen or worker; (5) the employee was terminated as the result of refusing
to perform the act directed by the employer; and (6) the employer was aware, or reason-
ably should have been aware, that the employee's refusal was based on the employee's
reasonable belief that the action ordered by the employer was violative of any of the above
circumstances. l
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for this proposition, as noted by the dissent.7 Currently there is no
clear, accurate way to predict how the Colorado courts will apply this
new standard at the trial level,8 or how the parties will satisfy or defend
against this additional employer knowledge element. 9
This Comment will describe some of the historical legal background
of the at-will employment doctrine, case law leading to this decision, the
court's rationale in recognizing the public policy exception, an analysis
of terminology, and an examination of the employer knowledge element
as set forth in Lorenz. Lorenz is also compared with other jurisdictions'
causation elements in similar fact patterns, as well as compared with cur-
rent federal and state legislative trends.
This Comment concludes that the employer knowledge element, as
an element of causation, is implicit within nearly all prima facie cases of
retaliatory discharge. An employee alleging retaliatory discharge cannot
prove causation without the inference of employer knowledge because
an employer must have a reason to retaliate. The employer who retali-
ates must know what event concerning the employee's conduct is the
source of the employer's desire to "get even." Thus, if retaliation is
proved in connection with the adverse employment action taken against
the employee, the employer knowledge element is implicitly proven as
well. To require separate proof on the employer's knowledge of the em-
ployee's state of mind concerning the employee's act or refusal to act is
superfluous once retaliation itself has been proven.
7. Id. at 118 n. 1 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Justice Erickson states in part, "Today's
test includes a sixth prong that substantially changes Cronk [I].... Indeed, the majority cites
no authority for requiring employer knowledge of an employee's reasonable belief that a
refused order was illegal." Id. (emphasis added). Authority does, in fact, exist for the
majority's proposition. lnfra notes 161-177 and accompanying text.
8. The trial date on remand has been set for January 24, 1994. Statement of Maxine
Foster, Denver District Court Division Clerk for Courtroom 19 (April 16, 1993) (No. 81
CV 6488). Twelve years after the suit was first filed, and eighteen years after Lorenz's
discharge, the parties will start over again with a new trial in accordance with the Lorenz
holding.
9. Because the Lorenz rule will apply retroactively, potential recovery still exists for
Lorenz. DavidJ. Jung and Richard Harkness, in The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4 LAB. LAw.
257 (1988), discuss and criticize various surveys of jury awards in wrongful discharge
cases. They note that averages are dubious at best because of their inherent sensitivity to
unusually high or low awards. Id. at 259. Based on Jung and Harkness' review of pub-
lished cases, California employees prevail in only 45% of judicially resolved cases with
estimated average awards at over $200,000. Id. at 260-61. Their research demonstrates
that the type of wrongful discharge affects jury awards. Of the three types of wrongful
discharges recognized in California as exceptions to the at-will doctrine (retaliatory,
breach of implied-in-fact contract, and violation of the implied law of good faith and fair
dealing in contracts), retaliatory and bad faith cases average much higher awards than do
breach of implied-in-fact contract cases. Intentional infliction of emotional distress cases,
a fourth cause of action in some jurisdictions also receive lower jury awards. Id at 262-64.
For other examples documenting large jury verdicts see Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241 (1984) ($100,000 compensatory and
$200,000 punitive damages award relating to a wrongful termination upheld); James N.
Adler & Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 LAB. LAw. 19, 19-20 (1992)
(noting multi-million dollar jury verdicts for damages in several wrongful discharge cases);
James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L. REv.
91, 113 n.80 (1989) (noting that, in one survey, employees were victorious 60-90% of the
time with verdicts averaging $400,000).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview
Early English common law recognized that a general hiring of a ser-
vant, in the absence of a contrary agreement, was presumed to be a one-
year hiring, and no master could "put away his servant" during that year
without "reasonable cause."' 0 Early colonial American law generally
followed the English common law regarding employment contracts, but
America "did not apply criminal law to employee breaches of con-
tract."'' By the late 19th century, New England textile industry employ-
ers were able to discharge employees without notice, yet still demand
notice from the employees when they quit. 12 After 1877, the American
courts adopted a doctrine known as "Wood's Rule" of at-will employ-
ment which, in the absence of a specific duration of employment, al-
lowed either the employer or the employee to terminate the
employment contract at any time for good cause, bad cause or no
cause.1 3 Controversy exists over whether the cases cited by Wood' 4 ac-
10. Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of
the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 721 (1991) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425-26 (2 1st ed. 1847)) [hereinafter Peck, Pene-
trating Doctrinal Camouflage]. The Statute of Labourers provided this language attempting
to protect employees hired for menial labor from termination without "reasonable cause,"
or without "reasonable notice," while also requiring certain classes of persons to accept
employment. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481,485 (1976). See also Lynn D. Feiger, "Employment At Will" and the
Discharged Employee in Colorado, 12 COLO. LAw. 733 (1983). Even after the Statute of
Labourers was repealed, English common law continued to presume employment con-
tracts as one-year terms, and by the 19th century the general rule was that "unless other-
wise explicitly agreed, employment could be terminated only after a notice period
determined by the custom in the trade, and if there were no custom, only after a reason-
able notice, unless cause existed[.]" Summers, supra at 485; Fieger, supra at 733. For more
detailed information on the Statute of Labourers, see Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Em-
ployment: Going, Going .. , 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187, 188 & n.5 (1990).
Charles Smith states that when no express or implied duration of time exists in a
contract of hiring (in England), the hiring is considered a general hiring for one year which
extends not only to servants, but also domestics and clerks. CHARLES M. SmiTH, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LaW OF MASTER AND SERVANT *84-*85. A contract must exist for the rule to
apply, and a contract will not be presumed when circumstances show that a pauper has
come "to live with their relatives or others out of charity, or where the agreement was for
cohabitation and not merely for service." Id. at *85-*86. Additionally, the presumption of
a one-year hiring could be "greatly strengthened" by trade, business or occupational cus-
tom. Id. at *86. In the proper circumstances, an employee wrongfully dismissed before
the end of the one-year term could seek a recovery of damages in the amount of wages he
would have earned had he been allowed to serve to the end of the year. Id. at "91. If,
however, the servant wrongfully quit his master's service, then the servant forfeited all
claim to wages for the remainder of that year. Id at *92.
11. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10, at 721.
12. Id.
13. H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 133, at 272-77
(2d ed. 1886). According to Wood, when the term of service in a contract of hiring is left
discretionary in any way with either party, then either may "put an end thereto at any
time." Id at 272-73. Wood also explained that an annual rate of pay does not imply a
definite term of employment where a term of employment is not otherwise stated, but
merely a contract to pay a certain rate for services actually rendered. Id. § 136, at 284-85.
Wood recognized that exceptions exist to the at-will employment doctrine, such as when
the employer requires the employee to perform illegal or immoral services, or acts that
would damage the employee's reputation. Id. § 148, at 297-98.
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tually support his "at-will" theory. 15 Nevertheless, many American
courts continued to follow the general doctrine of Wood's Rule in the
final years of the 20th century.
16
14. Id. § 133, at 272-73.
15. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv.
428, 432 (1964) (describing how the rigorous and restrictive application of Wood's rule
spread rapidly throughout the country); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employ-
ment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1979) [hereinafter Peck, Unjust
Discharges] (noting Blumrosen's demonstration that American courts followed this "erro-
neous" statement of law); Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10, at 722 (in
accord with his earlier article, but also crediting Field's New York Civil Code and 1 CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1999 (1872) with contributing to Wood's proposition in codified form); Sum-
mers, supra note 10, (none of Wood's four cases used as authority supported his theory);
Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983) (Wood's rule was unsupported by authorities upon which the
author relied, but was ideally suited to the United States' rapidly industrializing economy);
see also James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L
REv. 91 (1989) (arguing from an economics viewpoint that the at-will doctrine promotes
allocative efficiency in the free flow of labor, but employers should be held accountable
when the at-will doctrine is used to coerce employees to commit perjury or a tort); Peter S.
Partee, Reversing the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689 (1991); Jill S.
Goldsmith, Comment, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 161, 164 (1986); Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341-45 (1974).
Some commentators have endorsed Wood's rule as having been properly supported.
See generally Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood s Rule"
Revisited, 22 ARIz. ST. LJ. 551 (1990). Others have endorsed the at-will employment doc-
trine. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 947 (1984);
Hubbell, supra; Larry S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption That Employment
is Terminable At- Wil 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219 (1986-87); Richard W. Power, A Defense of the
Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 881 (1983).
For a sampling of the frequently cited commentaries criticizing the at-will doctrine,
see Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, supra; Donald H.J.
Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-at-
Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763 (1982); Donald G. Kempf, Jr. & Roger L. Taylor, Wrongful Dis-
charge: Historical Evolution, Current Developments and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 28 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 117 (1991); Massingale, supra note 10; Peck, Unjust Discharges, supra; Peck,
Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10; Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates:
Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988); Clyde W. Sum-
mers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7 (1988);
Summers, supra, note 10; Paul H. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The
Plaintiff's Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 178 (1988); Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for
a just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510 (1989); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980);
Note, Contracts-Termination of Employment at Will-Public Policy May Modify Employer's Right to
Discharge, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 624 (1960).
In contrast to the common law at-will doctrine, South Dakota statutes provide that the
length of time which an employer and employee adopt for the estimation of wages is rele-
vant to a determination of the term of employment. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-1-3
to -5 (Supp. 1992). In the absence of an agreement or custom as to rate of pay, an em-
ployee is presumed to be hired by the month at a monthly rate of reasonable wages, to be
paid when the service is performed. Id. § 60-1-4. If the parties continue the employment
relationship after the expiration of an agreement, they are presumed to have renewed the
agreement for the same wages and term of service. Id. § 60-1-5. This sets South Dakota
apart from all other U.S. jurisdictions by statutorily recognizing circumstances in the over-
all contractual relationship between employer and employee as factors to weigh against
the strict application of the at-will doctrine. Montana, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
also provide statutory exceptions to at-will employment, having enacted specific wrongful
discharge legislation which supersedes common law claims. See infra notes 195-201 and
accompanying text.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958):
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B. Precedent in Other States
In 1959, California became the first jurisdiction to expressly recog-
nize the public policy exception to at-will employment in Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396.17 In Peternann, an em-
ployee of the union, was instructed by the union's secretary-treasurer to
make untrue statements, under oath, to a California legislative commit-
tee. Instead, the employee truthfully answered all questions. He was
discharged by the union the following day.' 8 The court first acknowl-
edged that the plaintiff was an at-will employee subject to termination
for any reason at the will of either party. The court stated, however, that
such an at-will contract may be limited either by statute or by considera-
tions of public policy. 19 The court observed that the term "public pol-
icy" was imprecise, and noted that few cases could arise where the
expression is not disputed. 20 The court reasoned that in order to "fully
[Period of Employment] Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and
agent to employ and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are
terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employ-
ment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening events.
Id § 442. Comment b states that salary paid proportionally to units of time does not,
of itself, indicate that the parties have agreed that the employment is to continue
for the stated unit of time[,]... [but] merely indicates the rate at which the salary
... is to be paid, and either party is privileged to terminate the relationship at any
time unless further facts exist.
Id. at cmt. b. The RESTATEMENT also recognizes that when the principal directs the agent
contrary to an interest which he is privileged to protect, the agent's remedy is not to
violate the principal's orders but to obtain relief for breach of the principal's implied
agreement not to give unreasonable directions. Id. § 385 cmt. d and illus. 4 (1958). Fur-
ther, the RESTATEMENT provides that the agent has no duty to commit a tort or a minor
crime at the command of the principal, and that such a contract is illegal. Id § 418, cmt. a.
Finally, the RESTATEMENT repeats the content of § 385, stating that a servant may be justi-
fied in disobeying an unreasonable rule or order which the master is not privileged to
impose on him. Id. § 526, cmt. c. Thus, the RESTATEMENT both supports Wood's Rule and
at the same time recognizes that certain exceptions exist when the principal instructs the
agent to commit a tort or illegal act.
17. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). See Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra
note 10 at 723; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Ter-
minate Only in Good Faith, supra note 15, at 1822.
18. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 26.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. "Public policy" indeed escapes precise definition. For example, one interest-
ing and poignant definition of "public policy" is: "[a] will-o'-the-wisp of the law which
varies and changes with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and fashions of the day."
BALLENTINE'S LAw DiCTiONARY 1023 (3d ed. 1969) (quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d
553 (Va. 1954)). One often cited definition of "public policy" in retaliatory discharge
cases appears in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1980).
The Pierce court, in defining "public policy," stated:
[W]e must balance the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public.
Employees have an interest in knowing they will not be discharged for exercising
their legal rights. Employers have an interest in knowing they can run their busi-
nesses as they see fit as long as their conduct is consistent with public policy. The
public has an interest in employment stability and in discouraging frivolous law-
suits by dissatisfied employees.
Id.
See also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983) (ex-
panding and explaining the same definition without citing to Pierce, the court explains that
(1) employees are safeguarded against employer's acts that undermine fundamental poli-
cies, (2) employers retain flexibility to make needed personnel decisions during changing
economic conditions, and (3) society benefits from a stable job market and the protection
1993]
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effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury" employers must be
denied the unlimited right to discharge at-will employees when the rea-
son for dismissal was the employee's refusal to commit perjury.2' As a
result, violations of "public policy" should be defined as whatever con-
travenes good morals or any established interests of society, and "that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good." 92 2 In reversing the trial court, the Petermann court found that the
employee sufficiently alleged a cause of action.23
Fourteen years later, in 1973, a series of trend setting cases began
to lay out a framework of the types of employer actions that violate
"public policy." The Indiana Supreme Court in Frampton v. Central Gas
against frivolous lawsuits since discharged employees who do not allege a clear expression
of public policy violation will be dismissed on summary judgment or failure to state a
claim); BLAcK's L.Aw DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "public policy" as "that
general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fel-
lowmen, having due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation and situa-
tion."); Elletta S. Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule Comes of
Age: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 486 & n.32 (1991) (noting
inconsistencies in the articulation of the interests involved in various case law definitions
of "public policy").
21. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27. The employer advised the employee on the day before
the legislative committee hearing that the employee's work was "highly satisfactory," and
that the employee's discharge the day following the hearing was to "punish [the employee]
for testifying truthfully." Id. at 28. This case thus anticipates Blades' argument that em-
ployees should be permitted to bring a tort action rather than a contract action. Blades,
supra note 15, at 1422.
22. Id.
23. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27. In 1980, the California Court of Appeals sustained a
wrongful discharge cause of action in tort brought by an employee who refused to violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act by participating in his employer's price fixing scheme. Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). The court noted the factual similarity
to Petermann and the fact that wrongful acts committed in the course of a contractual rela-
tionship may afford both tort and contractual relief; thus the existence of a contractual
relationship does not bar the pursuit of redress in tort. .Id. at 1334. The court found that
an employer's authority over its employee precludes the right to order the employee to
commit a criminal act or coerce compliance with unlawful directions by discharge or
threat. In the same year, the same court decided Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443 (1980). Here, the court held that the employee's termination without legal
cause, after 18 years of satisfactory performance violated the implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 455-56. The longevity of the employee's service com-
bined with detrimental reliance on the employer's express employment policies operated
as estoppel precluding discharge without good cause. Id
For a chronological survey of recent California wrongful discharge cases, see Dabbs v.
Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437 (1987) (hospital respiratory
therapist was not required to allege violation of a specific statute to state a wrongful dis-
charge cause of action, but since the employee quit voluntarily, no constructive discharge
could be pleaded without alleging violation of a specific statute or actual termination);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (public policy questions must
involve a matter that affects society at large rather than a personal or proprietary interest
of employee or employer, and the policy must be well established or substantial); Gantt v.
Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (recognizing violations of employment public policy
as falling into four categories: (1) refusing to violate a statute, (2) prohibiting the perform-
ance of a statutory obligation, (3) discharge for exercising a statutory right or privilege,
and (4) discharge for reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance; af-
firming employee's cause of action without federal law preemption for termination in re-
taliation for testifying truthfully on behalf of a co-worker's sexual harassment claim). For a
more detailed discussion of California wrongful termination law, see Kempf and Taylor,
supra note 15.
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Co. 2 4 analogized retaliatory discharge with retaliatory eviction in land-
lord-tenant law, holding that termination of an employee in retaliation
for filing a Workers' Compensation claim "undermines a critically im-
portant public policy." 2 5 The court held that the employee stated a
cause of action as an exception to the general at-will employment rule
because the retaliatory discharge by the employer was an intentional,
wrongful act entitling the employee to compensation.
2 6
Retributive tort concepts of bad faith blended with contract princi-
ples in several subsequent cases. In 1974, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 2 7 held that a breach of employ-
ment contract occurs when an at-will employee's discharge is motivated
by bad faith, malice, or retaliation.2 8 The court stated that employment
contracts must be balanced between the interests of both parties.2 9 In a
similar application of precedent, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 30 held that an employee of over
35 years articulated a public policy cause of action when he was termi-
nated as a store manager for a burglary that occurred in his store on his
day off, because he was "at all times" responsible for the cash in the
employer's store.3 ' The Cloutier court held that to articulate a public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the employee must
24. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
25. Id. at 428. Interference with a citizen's rights, such as filing for worker's compen-
sation or serving on a jury, represent clearly defined examples of "public policy" viola-
tions. See supra, note 20 (definitions of "public policy").
26. Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 428. In addition to implying that this action sounds in
tort, the court hypothesized that if an employee has no remedy for retaliatory discharge,
"[w]hat then is to prevent an employer from coercing an employee?" Id.
27. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 551. In Monge, when an employee needed more materials to do her job,
which were refused, she was manipulated into a "no-win" situation and was fired that eve-
ning for refusing a foreman's order. The employee alleged that, in reality, she was
harassed by her foreman because she refused to go out with him. His anger, condoned by
the personnel manager, resulted in her termination. Id. at 550. She was reinstated after
complaining to the union, but became ill a few days later requiring a hospital stay. The
employer then terminated the employee for allegedly failing to "call-in" for a three day
period. Id. at 550-51. The court set forth a concise formula for evaluating employment
contracts:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's
interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the inter-
est of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in
maintaining a proper balance between the two.
Id. at 55 1. The court reasoned that the decision would create a "certain stability of em-
ployment," yet would not interfere with the reasonable business judgment to discharge
employees freely so as to operate efficiently and profitably. Id. at 552. See Blades, supra
note 15; Blumrosen, supra note 15.
30. 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981).
31. Id. at 1143-45. The court noted elements of bad faith: the employer discontin-
ued police protection for employees making deposits late at night in an unsafe area and
condoned leaving the cash in the safe overnight for deposit the next day; the employer
later claimed the employee violated company policy; immediately after a burglary, the em-
ployer resumed police accompaniment. Id. at 1144. Additionally, the employee was sus-
pended after a five minute meeting and was discharged in a similar manner after thirty-six
years of employment for the employer, while the assistant manager on duty when the bur-
glary occurred was not discharged. Id. The court noted that employees are entitled to a
day off, and cannot be responsible to their employer "at all times." Id. at 1145.
1993]
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first show that the employer was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retali-
ation.3 2 Secondly, the employee must demonstrate that he was dis-
charged because he performed an act encouraged by public policy, or
refused to perform an act that public policy would condemn.
3 3
The definition and scope of "public policy" was substantially broad-
ened to include general societal interests in another important precur-
sor to the Lorenz case, Nees v. Hocks.3 4 Here, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that the employer was liable, by exception to the at-will employ-
ment rule, for discharging the employee because she wanted to serve on
a jury.3 5 The court recognized certain circumstances in which an em-
ployer may commit a public policy tort by discharging an employee for a
socially undesirable motive.3 6 Thus, the Nees court created a right of
recovery for employees when "substantial societal interests" had been
violated.37 Similarly, in 1978, West Virginia recognized, in Haress v.
First Nat ' Bank in Fairmont,3 8 a cause of action in tort when the em-
ployer's motivation for discharge contravenes substantial public pol-
icy.3 9 The Harless court held that discharging an employee in retaliation
for attempts to bring state and federal consumer credit law violations to
the attention of the employer was a violation of public and statutory pol-
icies when the employee was protected by the statute.
40
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1143-44. The employee in Cloutier argued that the employer violated the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1988), by not
providing police protection and endangering employees with recognized hazards at the
place of employment. But the court stated that regardless of OSHA, the facts supported
the conclusion that the employee was discharged for furthering the public policy objective
of protecting the employees under him. Cloutier, 436 A.2d at 1145. But see Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). In Geary, the employee was an at-will sales-
man. When the employee complained to his employer that new tubular casings designed
for high-pressure use were dangerous to anyone using it, and that the testing was inade-
quate, the employee was ordered to "follow directions," which the employee did. Id. at
175. The employee persisted in taking his case to the "top" of the company, eventually
resulting in the product being reevaluated and withdrawn from the market. The employee
alleged his dismissal without notice violated general public policy and was malicious and
abusive. Id. The court declared Pennsylvania an at-will state, denying the employee's
cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 174-80.
Here, in contrast to the Lorenz case, the employee was not an expert in matters of
public safety, and the court stated that mere good intentions would not overcome the
employer's legitimate right-to discharge him at will. Id. The court hinted that a high rank-
ing employee or expert might be treated differently, but here the employee bypassed his
immediate superiors trying to use "inside contacts." Id. The court concluded that balanc-
ing the interests of both parties weighed in favor of the employer, and the discharge was
not a "spiteful retaliatory gesture designed to punish" the employee. Id. at 180 n..15. The
court added in dictum that it was not necessary to reject other jurisdiction's public policy
exceptions, but this employee failed to show "clear and compelling" mandates of public
policy. Id. at 180.
34. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
35. Id. at 516.
36. Id. at 515. See also Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984)
(holding employer liable for discharging the employee after the employee refused to sign
tortious and defamatory statements concerning another employee).
37. Nees, 536 P.2d at 516.
38. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
39. Id. at 275.
40. Id. at 275-76.
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Harless and Nees were influential in developing a public policy excep-
tion to at-will employment because they recognized that strict adherence
to the at-will doctrine could bring potential harm to society in general,
such as degradation of the jury system or unchecked dishonest banking
procedures. In addition, other states contributed to the wealth of cases
representing the expansion of public policy exceptions to the at-will rule
doctrine influential to the Lorenz decision.4 1 While Colorado never ex-
pressly rejected the possibility of recognizing a tort cause of action for
41. For example, in a chronological sampling, see Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing exceptions to the
at-will employment rule when actions contravene public policy when, as here, the em-
ployee was discharged for refusing to manipulate pollution control reports to be filed with
the state pursuant to statute); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn.
1980) (dismissing an employee for ensuring that the employer's products comply with
state law violates public policy when the employee must choose between risking criminal
sanction or jeopardizing continued employment); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127
(Mont. 1980) (recognizing public policy exceptions as refusal to self-perjure, retaliation
for employee's filing of Workers' Compensation benefits, refusal of sexual relations, and
possibly others in the future, but denying a cause of action to the employee for failure to
state a substantial or specific violation of public policy; common law now superseded by
MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903 to 914); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876 (II1. 1981) (employee stated cause of action when he was discharged in retalia-
tion for helping gather information to give to a local law enforcement agency concerning a
co-worker's possible criminal misconduct); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441
(Tenn. 1984) (holding that an exception to the at-will rule exists when an employee is fired
in retaliation for exercising Workers' Compensation rights); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (rejecting the "good faith" contract argument, but en-
dorsing breach of implied-in-fact contracts of employment when certain policies in the
employee manual have been detrimentally relied on by the employee, and recognizing a
tort cause of action for employee discharge in violation of clear mandates of public policy);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (recognizing a
"bad cause" exception to the at-will doctrine, which serves society's interest in preventing
employers from discharging employees for morally wrong reasons, such as here, where the
employee was fired by her supervisor in retaliation for refusing to "moon" the audience
along with the other participants in a campsite skit); Allen v. Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d
277 (Wyo. 1985) (recognizing that a wrongful discharge tort action as a public policy ex-
ception requires (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and (2)
there be no pre-existing remedy available to the employee);Johnson v. World Color Press,
Inc., 498 N.E.2d 575 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (employee discharged for disclosing violations of
federal security and fraud laws). For an insightful view of the Washington wrongful dis-
charge law, see Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10. For an analysis of
Wagenseller, see Goldsmith, supra note 15.
But see, e.g., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (de-
nying employee's request to modify the at-will rule when the employer failed to comply
with broad claims of available work made in the employee manual, and recognizing the
likelihood of frequent and vexatious lawsuits if the doctrine is changed). Note that Ten-
nessee does not recognize an exception in contract actions, only in tort as public policy
exceptions. See Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). Examples of
other cases denying an exception to the at-will doctrine include Muller v. Stromberg Carl-
son Corp., 427 So.2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to modify the at-will doc-
trine) and Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (no
implied obligation of good faith exists in employment contracts, and that rather than make
new judicial law, the legislature should interpret public policy).
For a detailed state by state analysis of the acceptance of the public policy wrongful
discharge cause of action, see Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 106-7 nn.2-5. Some clarification of
jurisdictional categories should. be noted. Delaware is listed as declining the public policy
exception. Id. at 106 n.4. But in March 1992, a lower court recognized a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. The employee's cause of action for wrongful
termination was sustained after he was terminated in retaliation for refusing to carry out
criminal acts which would have set prices in a government contract in excess of federal
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wrongful discharge, several years would pass before the Colorado
Supreme Court was presented with the right combination of a strong
claim and supporting opinions of the Colorado Court of Appeals and.
other populous jurisdictions.
C. Prior Colorado Cases
In 1974, well before the recognition of a tort public policy excep-
tion, the Colorado Court of Appeals decided Justice v. Stanley Aviation
Corp. 42 This contract case involved a discharged employee claiming that
his confirmation letter of employment from the employer at $12,000 per
year was for a definite period of one year, and that his discharge three
and a half months later constituted a breach of employment contract.
43
Applying the at-will doctrine, the court rejected this argument but did
not eliminate possible exceptions in contract, such as special considera-
tion. 44 The late 1980's brought a new era of expansion in Colorado
contract employment law,' recognizing reasonable expectations of em-,
ployees that employers should also be bound by their own promulgated
disciplinary and termination procedures. For example, in Continental'
Airlines v. Keenan,4 5 the Colorado Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee's reliance upon the specific procedures set out in the employee
handbook may be enforceable under contract theories of promissory es-
toppel or unilateral contract supported by the employee's continued:
performance.4 6 This principle remains sound in subsequent contract
employment law decisions in Colorado.
4 7
The issue of whether a tort cause of action could be sustained for,
regulations. Henze v. Alloy Surfaces Co., No. 91C-06-20, 1992 WL 51861, at 02 (Del.
Super. Ct. March 16, 1992).
Maine, Iowa and Utah are listed as not having ruled on the issue. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at
107 n.4. While Maine has not yet determined what type of public policy exceptions might
qualify for an exception to the at-will doctrine, the Maine Supreme Court hinted that a
wrongful discharge cause of action might exist if the record shows a clearly defined contra-
vention of public policy. Wilde v. Houlton Regional Hosp., 537 A.2d 1137 (Me. 1988). In.
1989, the Iowa Supreme Court in Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451'
(Iowa 1989), noted two exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine: (1) tort liability
when a discharge is in clear violation of a well recognized and defined public policy, and
(2) detrimental reliance by an employee on a contract created by the employer's policy
manual. In 1990, the Iowa Supreme Court expanded the scope of exceptions to include.
intimidation of employees into foregoing benefits entitled to them or risk losing their jobs.'
Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990). In Hodges v. Gibson'
Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that employment at-
will is limited by public policy exceptions, although the court declined to indicate whether
such a wrongful discharge would be in tort or contract. In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d
1280 (Utah 1992), the court held that violations of statutes clearly expressing Utah public,
policy are an exception to at-will employment sounding in tort. Id. at 1283-85.
42. 530 P.2d 984 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
43. Id. at 985.
44. Id. at 986.
45. 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
46. Id. at 711-12.
47. See, e.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988) (employer's
failure to follow its own employment policies to be evaluated under the Continental Airlines
standard); Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (af-
firming jury verdict finding employer in breach of implied contract or promissory estoppel
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wrongful discharge was first addressed by the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals in Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center.48 Here, a nurse was dis-
charged after she attempted to comply, contrary to the supervisor's
instructions, with her own interpretation of Colorado statutory regula-
tions regarding adequate nursing shift-coverage. Faced with the issue of
retaliatory termination, the court declined to expand tort law to limit the
employment at-will doctrine. Significantly, however, the court left open
the possibility of future wrongful discharge actions in tort if employees
relied on specifically enacted statutory rights or duties,4 9 as opposed to
a "broad, general statement of policy" 50 similar to the statute relied on
by the employee in Lampe.
5 1
In 1988, the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination in Montoya v. Local 3 of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 5 2 Here, the employee was discharged for
refusing to assist in illegal practices by management of the union. 53 The
for failure to follow termination procedures in an employment manual relied upon by the
employee). See also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
Traditional contract causes of action in employment cases continue to be an available
alternative to tort actions. See Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1986) (issue of fact existed as to whether the employee's employment contract as a
salesman was terminable at will, or "permanent" employment supported by special con-
sideration such as lower pay, experience or customer contacts); Magnuson v. Smith and
Saetveit, P.C., 722 P.2d 1020 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (employee's refusal to obey em-
ployer's reasonable instructions constitutes a material breach of employment contract);
Feiger, supra note 10, at 734-35.
48. 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
49. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee termi-
nated for filing Workers' Compensation claim stated a public policy exception to the at-
will rule). Supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. In Stivers v. Stevens, 581 N.E.2d
1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the court expanded on Frampton holding that the discharge of
an employee for merely suggesting that a Workers' Compensation claim would be filed,
was an even stronger rationale for the Frampton exception to the employment at-will doc-
trine. See Barbara J. Fick, 1991 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law: Labor and Em-
ployment Law, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 1311, 1315 (1992) (the Indiana Supreme Court recognizes
coercion of an employee as a public policy exception).
50. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-38-201 to -217 (1973) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 12-38.1-101 to -119 (1988)).
51. Lampe, 590 P.2d at 515. See Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1984). Corbin was similar to Lampe. The employee in Corbin claimed wrongful dis-
charge in violation of the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-3-
1086(2)(a) and OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a), when his employer directed him to perform
certain hazardous tasks. The Corbin court upheld the Lampe decision, holding that the stat-
utes relied on by the employee were broad general statements of policy similar to those
held to be inadequate in Lampe to justify adoption of an exception to the employment at-
will rule. Corbin, 684 P.2d at 267. In answer to the employee's argument that his termina-
tion was in violation of the company's own policy manual and thus a breach of contract,
the court upheld the at-will rule for employment contracts. Id. at 267. But see Continental
Airlines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (Colorado now recognizes promissory es-
toppel actions resulting from employment handbooks distributed to the employees).
Supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
52. 755 P.2d 1221 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). The court neither laid out the necessary
elements required for a prima facie case, nor the necessary causation analysis. The court
simply reversed and remanded the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the wrong-
ful discharge claim.
53. Id. at 1224-25. The court held that federal law did not preempt the employee's
state court action of wrongful discharge, and an issue of fact existed as to whether the
employee was wrongfully discharged for refusing to assist in illegal activities. Note that
1993]
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Montoya court -did not reach the issue of whether or not the action
sounded in tort. Later that same year, however, the Court of Appeals, in
Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Association (Cronk /),54 recognized the
tort of wrongful discharge and defined the five steps necessary to estab-
lish a primafacie wrongful discharge exception to the employment at-will
doctrine later adopted and modified by the Lorenz court. 55 In Cronk I,
the employees alleged wrongful discharge for refusing to engage in ille-
gal and irregular practices prohibited by Colorado public utility stat-
utes. 56 The Cronk I decision represented a major step toward
establishing solid exceptions to Colorado's employment at-will doctrine.
Nevertheless, the court did not expressly hold that the action sounded
in tort. In 1989, the Court of Appeals augmented Cronk I with its deci-
sion in Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc. ,57 allowing a wrongful discharge claim
for retaliation against the employee who exercised Workers' Compensa-
tion benefits. 58 The court expressly recognized an exception to the at-
will termination rule, and expanded the scope of the Cronk I public pol-
icy exception.
59
Federal courts in Colorado have closely paralleled Colorado deci-
sions recognizing exceptions to the at-will doctrine. In 1989, the U.S.
District Court, in Miedema v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Colorado,6° fol-
lowed Colorado's determination that an employee discharged for exer-
cising specific statutory rights or duties supports a cause of action for
wrongful termination. 6 1 More recently, in Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co. ,62
this case is factually similar to California's Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (employee discharged for refusing
to commit perjury to a legislative committee); supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
See also Farmer v. Central Bancorporation , 761 P.2d 220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting
that employee's discharge for refusal to violate federal banking laws could fall within a
public policy exception to at-will employment, but the employee was unable to prove a
violation); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,
782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989) (employee's claim for wrongful discharge, if available, is not
available at common law when wrongful discharge remedies are provided for by statute).
54. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied (Cronk 1) appeal after remand, 140
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2149 (Colo. Ct. App. April 2, 1992); cert. denied (Cronk I1).
55. Id. at 622 ((1) the employee refused to perform an action; (2) ordered by the
employer; (3) which would violate a specific statute; (4) whose terms are more than a broad
general statement of policy; and (5) that the employee's termination resulted from the
refusal to perform such action). See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
56. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 40-6-103 to -106 (1984).
57. 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 778 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989).
58. Id. at 1371-73.
59. Id. at 1373. The Lathrop court relied heavily on, Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; Martin Marietta
v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108 (Colo. 1992) (discussion of Lathrop and Frampton).
60. 716 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Colo. 1989).
61. Id. at 1371. The court, relying on Lathrop, 770 P.2d at 1367, held that Colorado
law precludes discharging an employee for filing a Workers' Compensation claim. See
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. See also Vaske v. DuCharme, McMillen & As-
socs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Colo. 1990) (recognizing Colorado retaliation claims
when employees exercise statutorily protected rights or obligations, or are discharged for
refusing to commit a criminal act directed by the employer but refusing to expand existing
Colorado tort law).
62. 773 F. Supp. 248 (D. Colo. 1991), aft'd, 971 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying
the modified prima facie standards of Lorenz and affirming Chief Judge Finesilver's District
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the U.S. District Court declined to apply the public policy exception in
the earlier 1990 Colorado appellate decision in Lorenz v. Martin Mari-
etta 63 because the employee failed to allege that she was directed to vio-
late a criminal law. 6 4 The court ruled, 6 5 and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, 66 that a federal court should not expand the existing wrongful
termination law or create a new category of exceptions to the general at-
will employment rule. The court held no action may be maintained
based solely on the employee's allegations that she was fired for exercis-
ing statutory rights under Colorado's physician/patient testimonial priv-
ilege by refusing to complete a medical form as part of the employer's
drug testing policy, when the employee did not contend the testing itself
to be illegal.6 7 In the 1992 post-Lorenz case of Smith v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 68 the U.S. District court acknowledged that current Colorado
law recognizes several public policy exceptions to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine, and allowed the employee's claims under these excep-
tions.6 9 Although the Tenth Circuit has followed state law closely, 70 not
all the federal courts have done the same.
7 1
Court ruling that summary judgment for the employer was proper as the employee "never
contended that she was being asked to perform an illegal act").
63. 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), aff'das modified, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
64. Mares, 773 F. Supp. at 252.
65. Id.
66. 971 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1992). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's reasoning, despite the application of the recently announced 1992 Martin Marietta
v. Lorenz decision. id. at 494-96.
67. Id. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1) (1973).
68. 794 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1992).
69. Id. at 1040-42. The court based its decision partially on both Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100
(Colo. 1992), and Continental Airlines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
70. See, e.g., Cooper v. Schneider Metal Mfg. Co., 945 F.2d 411, No. 90-1158 (10th
Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion of Table Decision) (District of Colorado court applying
Oklahoma law in the absence of applicable Colorado public policy exception law, but rec-
ognizing the Lathrop decision recognizing retaliatory discharge for filing Workers' Com-
pensation claims); White v. American Airlines, 915 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir. 1990) (employee
alleged a retaliatory discharge for refusing to commit perjury on behalf of American Air-
lines concerning the 1979 DC-10 crash in Chicago, and the court followed Oklahoma law);
Polson v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990) (following Kansas law); Home v.J.W. Gib-
son Well Serv. Co., 894 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying Wyoming law); Zaccardi v.
Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1988) (employee's refusal to sign polygraph consent
form did not violate any clear mandate of New Mexico public policy); Howcroft v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Utah 1989) (applying Utah law).
71. Several well known federal cases have denied recovery for wrongful termination
based on retaliation or public policies: Guy v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir.
1987) (employee discharged for refusing to falsify records required by the Food and Drug
Administration did not state an exception to the North Carolina at-will doctrine); Percival
v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (executive alleging a malicious
discharge by colleagues did not state a cause of action for wrongful termination); Fulford
v. Burndy Corp., 623 F. Supp. 78 (D.N.H. 1985) (employee alleging a retaliatory discharge
for having filed suit against his employer for injuries incurred by the employer's dog did
not state a cause of action under New Hampshire law).
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III. THE INSTANT CASE: MARTIN MARIETTA V. LORENZ7 2
A. Facts
Prior to accepting employment from Martin Marietta in 1972, Lo-
renz worked for Boeing Aircraft Co. on defense and aerospace projects
for 16 years 73 as a specialist in fracture mechanics. 74 Lorenz was well
educated at the time he accepted employment with Martin Marietta. 7 5
As a "principal investigator" 7 6 for Martin Marietta, Lorenz was respon-
sible for quality control of projects contracted for with the National Aer-
onautics and Space Administration (NASA). Lorenz complained to his
supervisors on several occasions about' inadequate testing and poor
workmanship on three separate projects.
77
Lorenz advised his supervisor that "NDI '" 7 8 contract proposals
made to NASA involved unrealistic cost assessments resulting in a false
contract price. 79 Lorenz advised his supervisors that the data was not
being communicated to the appropriate NASA personnel. 80 When no
action was taken by Martin Marietta, Lorenz contacted the NASA project
manager to relay the data.8 ' As a result of Lorenz's actions, a technical
review session was held by Martin Marietta with NASA and significant
technical issues about the Shuttle's safety were discussed.82 Lorenz,
who accurately drafted the minutes of the meeting,8 3 was instructed by a
superior to make modifications to them. Lorenz claimed the requested
modifications would not accurately reflect the course of the meeting.
84
Lorenz refused to make the changes, and instead issued a memorandum
stating that the modifications to the minutes were inaccurate. Lorenz
72. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
73. Id. at 102.
74. The study of stress resistance and tolerances for materials used in the construc-
tion of defense and aerospace equipment. Id.
75. Lorenz held a Bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from Polytechnic In-
stitute of Brooklyn, a Master's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
Washington, and a doctoral candidate in metallurgy at Colorado School of Mines. See
Brief Amicus Curiae by the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) for the
Respondent at 1, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90 SC 583).
76. The Principal Investigator is accountable for technical objectives. Id.
77. The "NDI Contract" was for the purpose of producing data regarding the quality
of Space Shuttle external tank designs, the "Mixed Mode Contract" involved building a
testing machine to be initially researched and developed with a $25,000 NASA contribu-
tion, and the "Tug Irad Contract" was for a space "tug" vehicle. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103.
78. The words which correspond to "NDI" are not spelled out in any of the Lorenz
appellate briefs or opinions. Although one possible definition of "NDI" is former Presi-
dent Reagan's "National Defense Initiative," it is not clear whether the "NDI" Contract in
Lorenz has any connection with Reagan's "National Defense Initiative" defense policy.
79. Respondent's Answer Brief at 5, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
80. Id.
81. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103.
82. Respondent's Answer Brief at 5, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
83. Id.
84. Martin Marietta claimed that Lorenz never accused his superior of making false
statements; that Lorenz considered the changes to be "new statements" of "new informa-
tion;" and that Lorenz was really concerned with pride of authorship of the minutes. Fur-
ther, "even if [the] additions were inaccurate, they were trivial." Petitioner's Reply Brief
at 19-20, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90 SC 583).
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was subsequently warned by management to start cooperating.8 5
On another occasion, Lorenz was pressured to attest to the ade-
quacy of a material for the Mixed Mode Contract.8 6 Lorenz discovered
that the machine could not perform its function due to shoddy work-
manship.8 7 He further learned that Martin Marietta had instructed em-
ployees to construct the machine for $10,000 instead of the $25,000 that
NASA allocated.88 When Lorenz complained to his supervisors, he was
ridiculed.8 9 A similar incident occurred concerning the Tug Irad Con-
tract. Despite the "enormous pressure levied against him", Lorenz re-
fused to attest to the adequacy of the material selected for the Tug,90
and refused to write the final report because the testing was, in his opin-
ion, inadequate. 9' Shortly thereafter Lorenz was terminated.
9 2
B. Case History
After the presentation of Lorenz's case, the trial court granted Mar-
tin Marietta's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, stating that
Colorado did not recognize common law tortious wrongful termina-
tion. 93 The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a tort claim for
wrongful termination based upon a public policy exception, 94 and ap-
85. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Respondent's Answer Brief at 7, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
89. Respondent's Answer Brief at 7, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583); Brief Amicus Curiae at 4,
Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
90. Respondent's Answer Brief at 8, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
91. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103. Lorenz stated in testimony that "these types of issues
could not be compromised without compromising . . . [his] professional integrity," or
without "jeopardizing the very purpose of... [his] involvement" with safety in Martin
Marietta's projects, and to do so would amount to "a downright fraud[.]" Id.
92. Id. at 104. Lorenz was notified of his lay-off status on July 22, 1975, and his last
day of work was July 25, 1975. Lorenz filed this action on July 24, 1981. Id. at 115. Lo-
renz filed his action one day short of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
For a discussion of the application of the statute of limitations, see infra notes 93-94, 113.
93. Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd as
modified, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992). Colorado does have limited statutory relief for
"whistleblowers:" COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (1973) ("whistleblower" stat-
ute for protection of state employees); COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-5-106 (1973) (prohibiting
termination of employees with garnered wages); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-2-104, -107 (1973)
(prohibiting fraudulent procurement of employees); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1973)
(prohibiting political firings); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1)(h) (1973) (prohibiting termi-
nations for testifying under the Labor Peace Act); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-118 (1973)
(prohibiting terminations of employees on jury duty). See Respondent's Answer Brief at
30, Lorenz, (No. 90 SC 583) (listing Colorado statutes restricting employer's ability to ter-
minate their employees). The court also based the dismissal on the fact that the six-year
statute of limitations started on the day Lorenz was notified of his lay-off, thus barring the
action. Lorenz, 802 P.2d at 1148. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973); supra note 92;
infra notes 94, 113.
94. Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), af'd as
modified, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo 1992). The appellate court also stated that the statute of
limitations began to run on the day after Lorenz was terminated-the day his "injury"
occurred. Id. at 1148-49. The court rejected Martin Marietta's argument that the statute
began to run on the day Lorenz was notified. Martin Marietta's argument was based on
authority involving discharges covered by state or federal statutes which provided specific
filing requirements. Id. See also Quicker v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 747 P.2d 682
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plied the Cronk I standard. 9 5 Lorenz had also alleged a violation of
U.S.C. § 1001,96 which the court held was specific enough to cover the
fraud which Lorenz alleged led to his wrongful termination.9 7 Applying
the Cronk I standard retroactively,9 8 the court determined that claims
arising out of the state's public policy did not preempt federal labor
laws.99
C. The Colorado Supreme Court Opinion
As a matter of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court recog-
nized a tort-based wrongful discharge cause of action. 10 0 However, the
court modified the Cronk 10 1 standards by adding a sixth prima facie ele-
ment requiring the employer's knowledge, or unreasonable lack thereof,
that the employee refused to perform the employer's directive because
of the employee's reasonable belief that the directive was illegal or con-
trary to public policy.' 0 2 Under the new prima facie standard set out by
the court, the employee must present evidence:
[1] that the employer directed the employee to perform an
illegal act;
[2] that the directed act be part of the employee's work re-
lated duties; or
[3] that the employer prohibited the employee from exercis-
ing either a public duty or an important job-related right
or privilege;
[4] that the action directed by the employer would violate a
specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy
relating to either the employee's basic responsibility as a
citizen or the employee's right or privilege as a worker;
[5] that the employee was terminated as the result of refusing
to perform the act directed by the employer; and
[6] that the employer was aware, or reasonably should have
been aware, that the employee's refusal to comply with the
(Colo. App. 1987) (explaining COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-403 [statute of limitation] as ap-
plied to a discrimination claim filed with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission; adopting
the federal rule in the absence of Colorado case law that notice of discharge begins run-
ning the statute, but improper notice equitably tolls it).
95. Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622; see supra note 5.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (originally enacted as the Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645,
§ 1001, 62 Stat. 749). 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides that:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document know-
ing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
97. Lorenz, 802 P.2d at 1149.
98. Id. at 1150.
99. Id. at 1150-51.
100. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 108-10 (Colo. 1992).
101. Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622. For the Cronk I elements, see text accompanying notes 4-
5.
102. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
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employer's order or directive was based on the employee's
reasonable belief that the action ordered by the employer
was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy
relating to the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of
the employee's legal right or privilege as a worker.1
0 3
The court acknowledged that Colorado has refused to enforce con-
tracts violative of public policy.10 4 Following this rationale, the court
reasoned that it was "axiomatic" that a condition in an employment con-
tract also be unenforceable when it is violative of public policy.
10 5
Neither an employer nor an employee should be allowed to perpetrate a
fraud on the government. Moreover, an employee should not be forced
to choose between keeping her job or committing a crime, or foregoing
a duty or privilege protected by law. 10 6
The court then evaluated Martin Marietta's contention that 18
U.S.C. § 1001 was too broad and general to support a wrongful dis-
charge claim. 10 7 The Lorenz court relied on United States v. Tobon
Builes, 108 United States v. Diogo,10 9 and Johnson v. World Color Press 10 as
guides to the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and determined that
the statute was designed to protect the government and innocent peo-
ple, such as Lorenz, from fraud.' The court was divided in a four to
three decision on the issue of applying the new standard prospectively
or retroactively; the majority holding that retroactive application ap-
plied."12 The Lorenz case was remanded for a new trial in accordance
103. Id.
104. Russell v. Courier Printing & Publishing Co., 95 P. 936 (Colo. 1908); Wood v.
Casserleigh, 71 P. 360 (Colo. 1902); Pueblo & Ark. Valley R.R. v. Taylor, 6 Colo. 1 (Colo.
1881).
105. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
106. Id. at 109-110. The court relied upon Lathrop, Cronk, Frampton, and Nees, in offi-
cially recognizing this cause of action. Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989); Cron* 1, 765 P.2d at 619; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425 (Ind. 1973); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
107. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13-16, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo.
1992) (No. 90 SC 583). Martin Marietta claimed that Lorenz offered no evidence that any
of the statements Martin directed of him were 'factually false," and that Lorenz's "self-
serving... opinion" was that the work was inadequate. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
108. 706 F.2d 1092 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
109. 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).
110. 498 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
111. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 111; supra note 96 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 1001). The Lorenz court
relied on Diogo, where the Second Circuit found 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to contain two distinct
offenses: (1) concealment of a material fact; and (2) false representation, in which "both
offenses may be the same, to create or foster on the part of a Government agency a misap-
prehension of the true state of affairs." Diogo, 320 F.2d at 901-02.
The Lorenz court also adopted the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in Johnson, which
declared the purpose behind 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as "establish[ing] a clearly mandated public
policy against deceptive practices aimed at frustrating or impeding legitimate functions of
government departments or agencies." Johnson, 498 N.E.2d at 577-78. For Tenth Circuit
interpretations of this statute and its criminal elements and proof, which is beyond the
scope of this Comment, see United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 405 (1991); United
States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). See also
United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941) (interpreting the purpose prior to codifica-
tion of the Act of June 25, 1948).
112. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 116-20 (Erickson,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with the court's newly pronounced standards."13
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Unanswered Questions
Although Colorado has now joined the majority of jurisdictions
114
in adopting the public policy exception in tort to the at-will employment
doctrine, new questions arise. The Lorenz court provided little guidance
as to what will satisfy the additional causation element of employer
knowledge in the newly recognized common law tort. Proving the first
five elements of a prima facie case under the Cronk I standard' '5 as
adopted by the Lorenz court, will implicitly prove the employer knowl-
edge element. Yet the Lorenz court added a "mens rea" requirement of
employer knowledge in a civil action."16 A wrongfully discharged em-
ployee must show that his employer knew, or should have known, that the
reason the employee refused to comply with the employer's order was
due to the employee's reasonable belief that the act directed by the em-
ployer was illegal, statutorily protected activity, or in clear contravention
of public policy relating to an employee's rights or privileges."l 7 It is
unclear whether these enumerations are exclusive, or whether "the pub-
lic policy exception encompass[es] an employee's 'whistleblowing' activ-




These questions are only partially answered by judicial opinions
subsequent to the Lorenz decision. Attorneys, to date, have no clear and
accurate precedent to determine what evidence sufficiently meets the ad-
The intent behind this Comment is a discussion and survey of the public policy exception
to the employment at-will doctrine, and how Colorado may be affected by the Lorenz deci-
sion. Because the court was split only on the issue of retroactive application of the new
standard, and also because of the limitations in the scope of this writing, the issues of
retroactive application and running of the statute of limitations will not be analyzed.
The underlying issue behind the dissent was whether the newly adopted standard
should apply to the parties before the court, as well as those on the docket for appeal. The
dissent claimed that the standard in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), for
determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively, was improperly
applied by the majority. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 117-20.
113. Supra notes 5-6. The court also unanimously agreed that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run on a tort wrongful discharge claim until the employee had been in-
jured by being separated from his employment. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 115-16; supra notes 92-
94 & 112.
114. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108. For a state-by-state comparison chart of the status of at-
will employment see 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (July, 1992).
115. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
116. 823 P.2d at 108-10. The court calls the added element an "additional evidentiary
requirement." Id. at 110. While this may indeed be an additional evidentiary require-
ment, it also acts as a mens rea requirement of the employer's state of mind.
117. Id.
118. Outline of Gilbert M. Romin, Esq., Tort of Wrongful Discharge Against Public Policy in
Colorado, at 6, used for a National Employment Lawyers Association [NELA] meeting
(April 24, 1992) and as part of the materials accompanying a Colorado Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation ("CTLA") CLE seminar, "Hot Topics in Employment Law" (Nov. 20, 1992), sec-
tion contributed by Darold W. Killmer, Esq., Developments in the Common Law of Colorado (on
file with author). Mr. Killmer is a partner, and Mr. Romfin currently practices with Feiger,
Collison & Killmer, in Denver, Colo. The author wishes to thank Mr. Killmer, Mr. Romn,
and Feiger, Collison & Killmer for their generous assistance.
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ded element of employer knowledge of the employee's reasonable belief
of illegality, or how the courts will construe the language set forth in
Lorenz.' 1 9 This section of the Comment will focus on the employer
knowledge requirement in Lorenz as it has been interpreted by subse-
quent courts, what additional case law may apply to satisfy the element,
and parallel legislative means of controlling wrongful discharge and
whistleblowing.
The Lorenz court reasoned that the additional evidentiary element
will result in providing the employer an opportunity to distinguish be-
tween conscientious employees truly concerned about the legality of
their employer's directive, and merely subordinate employees. 120 The
court further declared that the employer knowledge element provides
the employer with fair notice, prior to making a termination decision, of
the circumstances supporting the employee's reasonable belief that the
directed act was wrongful, against public policy, or prohibiting the em-
ployee's rights or lawful privileges. 12 1 In recognizing a tort cause of
action for wrongful discharge with an additional scienter element, the
court rationalized the Lorenz decision as not only limiting the employer's
discretion in discharging at-will employees, but also as (1) accommodat-
ing the employer's interest in worker efficiency and loyalty; (2) accom-
modating the employee's interest in not being coerced into having to
choose between almost certain termination of employment or engaging
in illegal conduct or conduct contrary to the employee's civic rights and
duties; and, (3) society's interest in maintaining a balance between the
two. 122
The goals of the Lorenz court are relevant to today's less than satis-
factory economic situation, and the ever-increasing big business control
119. Romin, supra note 118, at 4. This requirement means that, if nothing else, Colo-
rado plaintiff's lawyers can predict an additional hurdle in proving a prima facie case of
wrongful discharge in tort in relation to the public policy exception to at-will employment.
Lorenz is "not a model of clarity," leaving open other questions. For example, what types
of cases may arise under the claim of "wrongful discharge" out of the nearly infinite pos-
sibilities? Is an employee protected under Lorenz for merely opposing her employer's
wrongdoing without the protection of a specific statute or enumerated public policy?
Darold W. Killmer, Esq., Remarks at CTLA Seminar: "Hot Topics in Employment Law"
(Nov. 20, 1992).
The Lorenz court conceded that this evidentiary requirement will place on the em-
ployee an extra "burden" not articulated in Cronk 1, but claimed that the added element
will "not alter in a fundamental way the basic nature of the tort claim for wrongful dis-
charge outlined in the Cronk [I] decision." Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 110. The court did not state
any reasoning to show this extra requirement as beneficial to the public, excluding em-
ployers, or to the wrongfully discharged employee, who is already suffering an economic
loss.
Martin Marietta, on the other hand, feared that recognizing a public policy exception
to at-will employment would result in an "insubordinate employee [who] could hold man-
agement hostage by immediately threatening a claim under the generality of many statutes,
leaving management to choose between maintaining industrial discipline and predicting
how a jury might apply the statute." Brief for Petitioner at 27, Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90 SC 583) (emphasis added).
120. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 110.
121. Id.
122. Id. It is interesting to note that the Pierce public policy definition, supra note 20,
seems to appear in Lorenz.
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over much of the population's everyday lives and careers. The court,
however, potentially biased its own public policy decision in favor of em-
ployers by making the causation elements in a retaliatory discharge
under the public policy exception more difficult to establish (at first
glance) in Colorado than in other jurisdictions recognizing the excep-
tion.12 3 The Lorenz court further complicated the legal analysis by de-
claring the public policy exception a tort action, yet including contract
principles as part of the rationale that public policy exceptions sound in
tort. 124
. In employment cases, the element of employer knowledge is also
closely related to the proximity in time between the employee's refusal
to act or participation in a statutorily protected activity and the time of
the employee's discharge, and the burden of proving causation. If one
looks only for state case law (and federal case law interpreting state law)
duplicating the Lorenz court's specific employer knowledge element, lit-
tle will be found. 125 Analogies are plentiful, however, if one examines
other jurisdictions' interpretation and causation analyses of similar fact
patterns, federal and state wrongful discharge statutes, and whistleblow-
ing statutes. Many of these either expressly or implicitly require em-
ployer knowledge. 12 6 To make the connection between the Lorenz
court's "public policy exception" and "whistleblowing," one must em-
brace the view that, in effect, they are one and the same; both falling
under the broader common law category of "retaliatory discharge."
The difference is a matter of semantics.
B. Terminology and Plausible Implications
Under the broad category of common law wrongful discharge both
contract and tort actions exist.1 2 7 Retaliatory discharge is synonymous
with wrongful discharge. Both are synonymous with the public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule, and it may be argued that the
term "whistleblower" is likewise synonymous with all of these terms.'
2 8
123. See Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 118 n. I (Erickson, J., dissenting) (noting that "the majority
cites no authority for requiring employer knowledge of an employee's reasonable belief
that a refused order was illegal").
124. Id. at 109. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. The court rationalized
that since Colorado has a long-standing rule that contracts violative of public policy are
unenforceable, it is "axiomatic" that contractual terms in employment, such as "at-will,"
should "be deemed unenforceable when violative of public policy." Lorenz, 823 P.2d at
109. The court does not expand on or define their use of the word "axiomatic." The
court seems to presume this particular relationship between contract and tort employment
law to be so evident that no additional proof or reasoning is required. That is a debatable
issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
125. See infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
127. See 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (July, 1992) (state-by-state comparison
chart illustrating which states recognize the contract action, which states recognize the tort
action, which states recognize both, and which states recognize neither).
128. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 485 n.26 (using the terms "public policy exception
claim," "wrongful discharge," and "retaliatory discharge". interchangeably); see also
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1612-13 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "wrongful discharge" as "an
at-will employee's cause of action against his former employer, alleging that his discharge
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Both "retaliatory discharge" and "whistleblowing," if proven, infer a
motive of the employer's desire to "get even" with the employee for the
employee's words, acts, refusals or omissions to act. Yet, pursuant to
the at-will employment rule, such retaliatory behavior by the employer is
only actionable by the employee when a public policy exception to the
at-will rule exists.' 2 9 The synonymous relationship among the terms
"public policy exception," "wrongful discharge," "retaliatory dis-
charge," and "whistleblowing" is further supported in the facts of the
Lorenz case.'
30
Lorenz's refusals to (1) falsify reports to NASA, and his subsequent
disclosure to NASA of Martin Marietta's directive to him to change con-
ference minutes; (2) participate in Martin Marietta's scheme to misapply
NASA appropriations; and (3) submit to inadequate testing of Space
Shuttle components easily fall within the accepted definitions of all four
previously discussed terms. First, providing that Lorenz proves each
primafacie element of the tort as set out in Lorenz, an action exists as a
"wrongful" or "retaliatory discharge." Second, Lorenz's refusal to inac-
curately modify conference minutes and his subsequent disclosure of his
dispute with Martin Marietta to NASA, as well as Lorenz's allegation that
Martin Marietta defrauded the United States in violation 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001131 clearly fits the definition of a "whistleblower." 13 2 Finally, Lo-
renz's refusal to falsify reports to NASA, misapply NASA appropria-
was in violation of state or federal anti-discrimination statutes.... public policy.... an
implied employment contract .... or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;"
[with supplemental reference to "whistleblower acts"]); Id. at 1596 (defining "whistle
blower" as "an employee who refuses to engage in and/or reports illegal or wrongful
activities of his employer or fellow employees[;] . . . [e]mployer retaliation against whistle
blowers is often statutorily prohibited" [with reference to "wrongful discharge"]); Id. at
463 (defining "constructive discharge" as occurring "when an employer deliberately makes
an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into involun-
tary resignation.") (emphasis added); 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:21, 25-26 (May, 1987)
(comparing federal and state whistleblower protection statutes, and comparing conflicting
state case law decisions as to the inclusion of "whistleblowing" within the public policy
exception).
Other definitions of "constructive discharge" besides that in BLACK'S LAw DicTxON-
ARY, supra, are applicable. COLO. CIVIL JURY INs'rsUcrloNs 3d § 31:8 (Cum. Supp. 1993),
defines "constructive discharge" as occurring when "an employer deliberately makes or
allows an employee's working conditions to become so intolerable that the employee has
no reasonable choice but to quit or resign and the employee does quit or resign because of
those conditions," based upon a reasonable person standard. Other jurisdictions have
recognized the legal possibility of constructive discharge. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc., v.
Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988); Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 232 Cal. Rptr. 490
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (factually similar to the Lorenz case); Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.,
554 A.2d 757 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
For a detailed treatment on the definition of "whistleblowing," see James N. Adler &
Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 LAB. LAw. 19, 21 & n.8 (1992). Adler
and Daniels define whistleblowing as "an elusive concept" that includes an employee's (1)
opposition internally or externally to their employer's conduct; (2) refusal to commit an
illegal act for the employer; (3) reporting a perceived impropriety to the supervisor, gov-
ernmental agency or media; or (4) bringing an action against the employer alleging the
employer submitted false claims to the government. Id
129. Each jurisdiction has their own definition of public policy. See supra note 20.
130. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 96.
132. See supra note 128.
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tions, and participate in inadequate testing clearly fit the Lorenz
definition of the public policy exception, as these acts force Lorenz to
choose between committing an illegal act or losing his job. Further-
more, Lorenz was directed to inadequately test Space Shuttle compo-
nents, paid for by taxpayers, which would be trusted with the lives of
astronauts who, presumably, do not know of the inadequate testing. In
light of the Space Shuttle "Challenger" tragedy, it is difficult to describe
a public policy more compelling than the protection of human lives.
13 3
If one accepts the view that "public policy exceptions,"
"whistleblowing," "wrongful discharge" and "retaliatory discharge" are
synonymous, and therefore are all really the same cause of action in tort,
it is but one short step further to infer that any primafacie case of retalia-
tory discharge under the Lorenz standard inherently implies employer
knowledge if the first five elements in Lorenz have been shown. 134 Once
the employee, by a preponderance of the evidence, shows the first five
Lorenz elements, the sixth employer knowledge element will be satisfied
by implication. An analysis of the first five individual elements in the
Lorenz standard reveals the inherent employer scienter element.
Using the Lorenz fact pattern, when Lorenz was directed by Martin
Marietta to approve inadequate component testing, participate in a pro-
ject in which NASA funds were misappropriated, and materially change
the contents of official minutes of a meeting in which NASA addressed
Lorenz's personal complaints of wrongdoing,' 3 5 the first four Lorenz ele-
ments were satisfied.' 3 6 Lorenz successfully showed that he refused to
do something ordered by Martin Marietta which would be either against
the law or against public policy. The fifth Lorenz element, termination of
employment for refusing the employer's directive (retaliation), was satis-
fied when Lorenz was laid-off shortly after refusing to write the final
evaluation report endorsing the Tug-Irad project.' 3 7 At this point, the
prima facie case is complete because the retaliation has been shown. By
showing the employer's retaliation, the employee has also shown the im-
plicit scienter element. No primafacie case will occur if the ordered act is
not against a specific statute or a clear public policy. Realistically, how
can an employer retaliate against an employee without knowing or believ-
ing the employee to have committed an act against the employer's inter-
est, or that the employee refused to act in favor of the employer's
interest? Retaliation simply cannot "exist" in the absence of a reason to
retaliate.
Thus, since the Lorenz employer knowledge element is inherent
within the first five Lorenz elements of a primafacie retaliatory discharge,
there is no need for a separate employer knowledge element. In effect,
the additional scienter element added by the Lorenz court is unneces-
133. See supra note 20 for public policy definitions.
134. See Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109. See supra text accompanying note 103.
135. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text (factual summary of the Lorenz case).
136. See supra text accompanying note 103 (the Lorenz elements).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
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sary.' 38  Cases subsequent to Lorenz, other jurisdictions' case law, and
federal and state legislation may now be examined in a different light
when the issue of causation is compared to the Lorenz standard. A Colo-
rado plaintiff's attorney may find more persuasive authority available
than a first impression would otherwise indicate.
C. Cases Subsequent to Martin Marietta v. Lorenz
The first Colorado appellate decision13 9 to use the Lorenz standard
with the additional employer knowledge element was the appeal after
remand of Cronk J.140 The Colorado Court of Appeals in Cronk II,
adopted the Lorenz standard and applied the additional employer knowl-
edge element. 14 1 The Cronk H decision identified Lorenz as a case con-
templating explicit employer directives. Conversely, expanding on the
Lorenz standard, the Cronk H court concluded that Lorenz "also embraces
situations in which an employee is so directed implicitly, resulting in a
retaliatory termination."'
142
The employer in Cronk H contended that the Lorenz standard had
not been met because the employees were not directed to violate the
law, nor were they fired for refusing to violate any law or public pol-
icy. 14 3 The employer also alleged that the "actual or constructive [em-
ployer] knowledge" element set out in Lorenz 144 had not been met by
the employees. 14 5 The former employees countered that (1) they had a
statutory duty to oppose their employer's intentional concealment of
138. From a non-legal perspective, the additional evidentiary requirement of employer
knowledge equates to proving: "I know that you know that I know." If, of course, the
employee fails to show evidence of a prima facie case, the employee is nothing more than an
out-of-luck and out-of-court former at-will employee. If the employee cannot prove
"wrongfulness" on the part of the employer in discharging the employee (retaliation),
then the employer knowledge element is irrelevant.
Support for the theory that the employer knowledge element is inherent when the
employer's retaliation is proven may be found in Crank 11, see infra notes 140-48 and ac-
companying text. See also Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (the employer knowledge element is "simply a factor to consider in determin-
ing the principal question of causation").
139. Crank II is the only Colorado appellate decision, to date, to use the Lorenz stan-
dard. At least one Colorado district court has adopted and applied the Lorenz standard.
See Stuart v. St. Anthony Hosp. Systems, No. 91 CV 2809, slip op. 2-3 (Denver Dist. Ct.
Feb. 21, 1992) (applying the Lorenz standard, and finding issues of fact existed as to
whether the employee was discharged in retaliation for reporting specific violations of
both statutes and regulations concerning medication disbursement, patient privacy, and
mandatory emergency procedures) (emphasis added); Romin, supra note 118, at 6.
140. Crank 1, 765 P.2d at 622. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
141. Crank II, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2153.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 2-4, Crank II (No. 90 CA 0666).
144. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 102.
145. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Crank 11 (No. 90 CA 0666). The em-
ployer alleged that the Crank I and Lorenz courts "wisely chose to limit such claims to those
brought by employees with a direct stake in an issue, who presumably are knowledgeable of the
circumstances and in a position to assess the validity of their employer's actions." Id. (emphasis
added). This represents an extreme interpretation of the use of the terms "actual or con-
structive knowledge" quoted from Lorenz. "Constructive knowledge" is defined as: "[i]f
one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is deemed to have had
constructive knowledge of such fact." BLAcKs LAw DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990).
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public utility statute and safety violations; (2) they refused to aid and
abet these illegal practices by their employer; and (3) they were fired in
retaliation for refusing to conceal these illegal practices. 14 6 The em-
ployees further alleged that the employer knowledge element was satis-
fied because the jury was required to find that the employees' exercise of
a statutorily protected right or duty be a substantial or a motivating fac-
tor in the employer's decision to discharge the employees. 147 Thus, em-
ployer awareness was implied because "the jury could not have found that
the [employees] were discharged for opposing illegal acts without finding
that the [employers] knew they were opposing illegal acts."'
4 8
The Cronk II court agreed with the former employees, affirming the
trial court jury verdicts finding that the employees' exercise of statutory
duties were implicitly prohibited by the employer, thereby "comport-
ing" with the Lorenz standard.149 The Cronk II court concluded that the
Lorenz employer knowledge element was satisfied because "the jury was
required to consider and find that [the employer] knew or should have
known that [the employees] opposed [the employer's] practices because
they believed that such conduct was illegal."' 150 The three former em-
ployees were each awarded an average of $535,580.00 in economic dam-
ages, punitive damages and pre-judgment interest. 15 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
adopted the Lorenz standard, including the employer knowledge ele-
ment, in Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co. 152 The employer knowledge ele-
ment was not applied by the court, however, because the employee
never contended that the employer's drug testing policy was illegal, but
instead objected to filling out an accompanying medical form.1
5 3
D. Applicable Case Law From Other Jurisdictions
Few decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with the public pol-
icy exception "give explicit consideration to the elements of the claim,"
146. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 2-3 nn.2-5, Cronk II (No. 90 CA
0666). Many of the former employees' allegations were supported in the record, and
Plaintiff Cronk was discharged "just two days after the [Public Utilities Commission] an-
nounced publicly it was going to investigate [the employer] for illegal activity," thus infer-
ring that the time interval regarding Cronk's discharge implied retaliation. Id. at 2 n.4.
147. Id. at 4-5.
148. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
149. Cronk H, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2153.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2150. For a discussion on high jury verdicts, see supra note 9.
152. 971 F.2d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1992); see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying
text. In another recent case, the Lorenz standard was adopted, but the employer knowl-
edge issue was precluded by the granting of the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment. Meehan v. Amax Oil & Gas, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 461, 468 (D. Colo. 1992) (granting
the employer's summary judgment motion because the employee was never directed to act
in a certain way, never prohibited from exercising a job-related right or privilege, and did
not support his allegation that his discharge violated a clearly expressed public policy, but
instead articulated only a generalized public policy). See also Lampe v. Presbyterian Med.
Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (broad, general statements of public policy held
inadequate to state a cause of action).
153. Mares, 971 F.2d at 496.
[Vol. 70:4
MARTIN MARIETTA V. LORENZ
or "address the allocation of the burden of proof.' 154 In the few opin-
ions discussing the appropriate elements at common law, as few as one,
to as many as six elements (as in the Lorenz case), are described with very
little consistency in the approaches taken.' 55 One commentator has
154. Callahan, supra note 20, at 488. Normally, the employee will have the burden of
proving a prima facie case, and the employer will have the risk of nonpersuasion in cases
where there is a factual dispute over the employer's motive in discharging the employee.
Id. at 507-12 (cases involving "employer pretext" or "mixed motives). In situations where
the termination is alleged by the employer to be unrelated to the employee's protected
acts or refusal to act, or the employer's reasons for discharge are enumerated in statutes as
exceptions, a "mixed-motive" situation exists. Id. Ordinarily, following the employee's
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the "same decision" would
have been made notwithstanding the employee's protected activity. At this point many
courts will allow a shift back to the employee (who maintains at all times the ultimate
burden of persuasion) to show that the employer's proffered reason was "mere pretext."
Id. Employment discrimination cases are, however, "arguably distinguishable from public
policy exception cases because most terminations litigated pursuant to that statute are...
based on [the plaintiff's] membership in a protected class, as opposed to protected con-
duct." Id. at 484 n.19.
The United States Supreme Court has set out a skeletal framework for discrimination
cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 256 (1981) (in
an employment discrimination case the employee retains the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against her, and that the
employer's proffered reason was pretext), explaining and modifying McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (in a discrimination case the employee has
the initial burden of establishing a primafacie case of discrimination; the burden then shifts
to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection;" and the employee again bears the burden to prove that the employer's
reason for rejection was a "cover-up," or pretextual).
The federal and state courts have not, however, been consistent in the application of
the employment discrimination burden shifting in retaliatory discharge cases. Compare
Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1991) (following Burdine
and McDonnell Douglas) with Swearingen v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559,
562 (5th Cir. 1992) (one shift; employee bears the initial burden of establishing a causal
link between the discharge and the protected activity [worker's compensation claim],
which need only be proof that the employee's protected activity was a "determining fac-
tor" and not necessarily the sole factor in the discharge; the burden then shifts to the
employer who then must rebut this presumption by showing a legitimate reason for the
discharge).
State decisions also reflect a variety of burden-shifting analyses as applied to the cau-
sation element in the common-law public policy exception in tort. See, e.g., Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (employee alleging retaliatory
discharge bears the burden of proving that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public
policy); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc., v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1985) (employee has
burden of proof and persuasion; the fact finder decides if the employer sought to have the
employee commit an illegal act); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089
(Wash. 1984) (employee has the burden of proving his dismissal violates a clear mandate
of public policy; burden shifts to the employer to prove that the dismissal was for reasons
other than those alleged by the employee); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d
834, 840-41 (Wis. 1983) (employee has the initial burden of proving that the dismissal
violates a clear mandate of public policy; the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
the dismissal was for just cause). For a detailed discussion of burdens, shifts of burdens
and employer "privileges," see Callahan, supra note 20, at 507-14.
155. Callahan, supra note 20, at 488-89 nn.39-42. See, e.g., Kennard v. Louis Zimmer
Communications, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 635, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (one element: primafacie case
made when employee proves the discharge was for conduct protected by the public policy
of the state); Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (two
elements: the employee must establish that (1) a public policy of the state of New York
exists, (2) which was violated by the employer); Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington,
Inc., 519 N.E.2d 909, 911 (111. 1988) (three elements: (1) the employee must show a dis-
charge occurred; (2) the discharge was in retaliation for her activities; and (3) that the
19931
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proposed that when an employee is discharged for exercising a statutory
right or public duty, refusing to participate in wrongful or illegal activity,
or "blowing the whistle" on others' harmful conduct, few distinctions
are necessary between these categories. 15 6 Rather, the following ele-
ments are suggested: (1) an act or refusal to act by the employee; (2)
which was supported by public policy, (3) bearing a causal relationship
to (4) the employee's discharge.' 5 7 The element of causation, then, ap-
pears central to understanding the employer knowledge and temporal
elements. Because "an employer cannot fire an employee in retaliation
for actions of which the employer is unaware," the employee, in proving
a causal relationship, "must show that the employer was aware of the act
or refusal to act in question prior to the discharge," and relate this to
the temporal proximity of the employee's act or refusal to act, and the
subsequent discharge.
158
Although there is a dearth of case law explicitly saying so, it is rea-
sonable to find that when an employee is discharged almost immediately
after the employer becomes aware of the employee's act or refusal to
act, a retaliatory motive may reasonably be inferred. The chain of causa-
tion is relatively short, and often blatant. First, the employee does or
says something (or refuses same) that the employee perceives is illegal
or clearly violative of "public policy."' 59 Next, the employer finds out
(awareness of the act must occur for retaliation), and, after what is often a
short duration of time, the employee is either discharged, psychologi-
cally pressured by supervisors and peers to quit, or simply "laid-off."
When the fact-finder determines retaliation has occurred, a demonstra-
ble interrelationship to societal concerns must be shown, which should
discharge violated a clear mandate of Illinois public policy); Hicks v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622 (five elements:
the employee must prove (1) that he refused to perform an action, (2) ordered by his
employer, (3) which would violate a specific statute, (4) whose terms are more than a broad
general statement of policy, and (5) that his termination resulted from his refusal); Lorenz,
823 P.2d at 109 (six elements).
156. Callahan, supra note 20, at 490.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 497-98. Callahan notes that evaluation of the timing of the employee's act
or refusal to act, and the employer's response (discharge or constructive discharge) "is
highly relevant to the characterization of a possible connection between them." Id. at 498.
One recent common-law decision combines these two elements in a retaliatory discharge
action under the "whistleblowing" label. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing
Co., 795 S.W. 2d 723, 732-33 (Tex. 1990) (to establish causation, the employee must
demonstrate that (1) the employer had knowledge of the whistleblowing prior to the retali-
ation; (2) the discharge must be shown to have occurred within a reasonably short time
after one or more complaints were lodged; and (3) the burden then shifts to the employer
to refute the causation element by proving dismissal occurred for reasons other than the
act of whistleblowing).
For examples of cases referring to the temporal element, see Hamann v. Gates Chev-
rolet, Inc., 910 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990) (employee failed to prove relevant timing
between her refusal to act and her discharge, despite the court's recognition that rapidity
and proximity in time between refusal and discharge, when considered with other circum-
stances, may create the necessary inference of the employer's prohibited motive); House v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 556 A.2d 353, 357-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (three month
interval between the employee's whistleblowing activity and discharge prevented inference
of retaliatory motive). See supra note 138.
159. See supra note 20.
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be given superior weight in the balancing process. 16 0
As the following cases demonstrate, some authority exists support-
ing an employer knowledge element within a prima facie case of retalia-
tory discharge. While Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co. 161 follows Lorenz, two
Tenth Circuit cases pre-dating Lorenz required employer knowledge as
proof of causation. In White v. American Airlines, Inc., an employee was
discharged for refusing to commit perjury in litigation that followed the
disastrous 1979 crash of an American Airlines DC-10 jetliner over Chi-
cago's O'Hare Airport. 16 2 The court held that jury instructions which
included a required finding that the employer knew of the employee's
refusal to commit perjury prior to the employee's discharge sufficiently
satisfied the causation requirement. 163 In Stuart v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 164
the court applied Kansas precedent 165 and required employer knowl-
edge in a whistleblowing case. In Stuart, the employee was required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a reasonable person
would conclude that the employer was engaged in wrongful or illegal
activity; (2) the employer had knowledge of the employee's act or refusal
prior to discharge; (3) the employee was discharged in retaliation for
such act or refusal; and (4) the employee's act or refusal was due to a
good-faith concern about the employer's wrongful activity, and not out
of spite. 1
6 6
Prior to Colorado's wrongful discharge tort standard described in
Cronk 1, 167 and expanded by Lorenz, 1 6 8 the Kansas Supreme Court rec-
ognized the tort of retaliatory discharge in the whistleblowing case of
Palmer v. Brown. 169 While the Palmer standard, like the Lorenz standard, is
not a model of clarity, it does require clear and convincing evidence of
the employee's good faith belief that the employer's activity was con-
trary to public policy or illegal, and that "the employer had knowledge of
160. Callahan, supra note 20, at 486-87.
161. 971 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1992).
162. 915 F.2d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 1422. The White court affirmed the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma regarding instructions to the jury that included among the
essential elements of wrongful discharge: (1) the employee was requested to commit per-
jury; (2) the employee refused to commit perjury and the employer knew of the employee's
refusal; and (3) the employee was terminated because of his refusal to commit perjury. In
order to find the employer liable, "the jury had to conclude that American knew about
White's refusal to commit perjury and terminated his employment because of that re-
fusal." Id. Further, the jury could find liability "only if the American officials responsible
for [White's] termination were in fact aware that [White] refused to commit perjury." Id.
(emphasis added).
164. 753 F. Supp. 317 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd, 936 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1991).
165. See Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988).
166. Stuart, 753 F. Supp. at 324. See also Wolff v. Berkley Inc., 938 F.2d 100, 103 (8th
Cir. 1991) (holding that "[iun order to succeed on a claim for retaliatory discharge, the
[employee] must prove a causal relationship between statutorily protected activity and her
termination . .. [which] does not exist if the employer is not aware of the employee's
statutorily protected activity") (emphasis added).
167. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, appeal after remand, 140 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied (Cronk II).
168. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
169. 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988). Palmer was decided in March, while Cronk I was
decided in July.
1993]
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the employee's reporting of such violation prior to discharge." 170 The
Palmer standard requires clear and convincing evidence, rather than a
"presentation" of evidence as in Lorenz.1 7 1 Palmer was applied in Pi/cher
v. Board of County Commissioners, 172 in which the Kansas Court of Appeals
interpreted the Palmer standard liberally by not limiting retaliatory dis-
charge claims to violations of law pertaining to public health, safety, and
the general welfare, 173 but instead indicated that First Amendment free-
dom of speech violations may support a whistleblowing retaliatory dis-
charge claim. 17 4 These cases suggest the employer knowledge element
170. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The Palmer standard provides that:
To maintain such action, an employee has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence, under the facts of the case, a reasonably prudent person
would have concluded the employee's co-worker or employer was engaged in ac-
tivities in violation of rules, regulations, or the law pertaining to public health,
safety, and the general welfare; the employer had knowledge of the employee's
reporting of such violation prior to discharge of the employee; and the employee
was discharged in retaliation for making the report. However, the whistleblowing
must have been done out of a good faith concern over the wrongful activity re-
ported rather than from a corrupt motive such as malice, spite, jealousy or per-
sonal gain.
Id.
171. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
172. 787 P.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
173. Id. at 1209. In Pikcher, the court ruled that the employee may be entitled to dam-
ages upon proof that her employer fired her because the employer believed the employee
to be the source of an uncomplimentary newspaper article. Id at 1208. The court also
concluded that the employee, a public employee, was discharged in contravention of pub-
lic policy when she was discharged for exercising her right to free speech, as long as her
speech regarded a matter of public concern. Id. See also O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d
149, 150 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (dicta) ("There are many facts which would be
pertinent . . . includ[ing] whether the [employer] knew or should have known the act in
question was illegal, the extent of (the employee's] training and qualifications[,] . . . and
generally, the reasonableness of the acts by all of the parties.").
Cases involving truck drivers who were discharged after reporting matters of safety
offer analogous fact patterns to that in Lorenz, and although employer knowledge is not
stated as an element in these common law tort actions, the employer's knowledge may
easily be implied. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390
(Ind. 1988) (at will truck driver stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge after he was
terminated for refusing to illegally transport an overweight load); Pooler v. Maine Coal
Prod., 532 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1987) (trucker failed to state a cause of action by not pointing
to a violation of motor vehicle law, only a potential violation of law); Coman v. Thomas
Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1989) (at-will trucker stated cause of action after he was
terminated for refusing to operate his truck in violation of Dept. of Transportation regula-
tions, and for refusing to falsify the logs of travel). But see Burrow v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 363 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (at-will trucker failed to state a cause of action
after being discharged for refusing to drive under allegedly unsafe conditions, because
holding every discharge for failure to perform an allegedly unsafe act as actionable "would
create a prolific and unwarranted source of trouble in the workplace"); see also Todd v.
Frank's Tong Serv., Inc., 784 P.2d 47 (Okla. 1989) (former truck driver stated a cause of
action when he was discharged for refusing to operate his truck in violation of Oklahoma
statutes prohibiting operation of motor vehicles with defective brakes, headlights and turn
signals).
174. Pitcher, 787 P.2d at 1208. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 283, 287 (1977) (Supreme Court directed the district court on remand to
apply the "same decision" test regarding whether an untenured schoolteacher was entitled
to reinstatement due to denial of First Amendment rights by the school board in its deci-
sion not to rehire the teacher). See supra note 154 (brief discussion of burden-shifting).
The burden shifting test used in discrimination cases is an alternate type of causation
test to that used in typical tort actions for wrongful discharge in state jurisdictions, but the
respective results obtained are similar: the finding of discrimination or the finding of retal-
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exists in several jurisdictions explicitly. They do not, however, provide a
sound argument to counter the proposition that employer knowledge is
inherent within a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, and that most
jurisdictions presumably treat such knowledge as implicit within the cau-
sation framework of a prima facie case of retaliatory termination.'
7 5
Once retaliation is established, it is unnecessary to prove, as the Lorenz
decision requires, that the employer knew or should have known of the
employee's belief that the directed act was illegal, fraudulent or against
clear public policy. An employer must know what she is retaliating
against the employee for. Therefore, only the first five elements of the
retaliation claim itself, as set out in Cronk 1, 176 and modified in Lorenz,1
7 7
need be proven by the employee.
Nevertheless, employment law attorneys cannot afford to overlook
the employer knowledge element simply because it is implied in the cau-
sation analysis of a retaliatory discharge. This "additional evidentiary
requirement"178 of employer knowledge of the employee's belief that a
directed act was illegal or contrary to clear public policy should not pro-
vide any unusual difficulties evidentially. Issues of hearsay should not
present serious problems regarding proof of the employer's knowledge
of the employee's act or refusal, and the subsequent retaliatory dis-
charge. The employer's business records, reports and memoranda, or
unusual absence thereof, made at or near the actual occurrence, by a
person with knowledge, in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity may disclose employer knowledge. ' 79 Likewise, depositions and
interrogatories may be used to impeach inconsistent statements by wit-
nesses or the employer.' 8 0 Because employer knowledge is a required
element of Colorado's common law tort of retaliatory discharge, hearsay
as to the employer's state of mind and motive is admissible.' 8 ' More-
over, well prepared cross-examination will also bring out employer
knowledge which may have otherwise remained undisclosed.1
8 2
E. Legislation
One solution to this common law problem may lie in legislation
containing specific definitions of protected (employee) and prohibited
(employer) conduct. Federal discrimination and whistleblowing legisla-
tion is broad in diversity, yet at the same time limited in coverage to
iation. Many times both are present in a successful and well pleaded plaintiff's case.
Thus, some valuable analogies exist in federal discrimination cases which may prove influ-
ential in state common law wrongful discharge actions.
175. Retaliatory termination, as a term of art, should include the legal and semantic
synonyms, "wrongful discharge," "whistleblowing," and "public policy exceptions" to the
at-will employment doctrine. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 485 n.26. See supra notes 127-
138 and accompanying text.
176. Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622.
177. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
178. Id. at 110.
179. COLO. R. EVID. 803(6) & 803(7).
180. CoLo. R. EVID. 801(d)(l) & 801(d)(2).
181. COLO. R. EVID. 803(3).
182. See, e.g., 7 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §§ 10, 20, 24-26 (1975 & Supp. 1992).
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specialized or protected classes. The employee who is not in a recog-
nized class or represented by a union has analogous federal law only as
secondary authority.' 8 3 While federal "whistleblowing" statutes may
183. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 484 & n.19. Callahan notes that termination is a
common element between federal statutes which provides "useful insights" in reasoning,
but is distinguishable because common law wrongful discharge involves litigation gener-
ally based on protected conduct rather than membership in a protected class. Id.
Adler & Daniels, supra note 128, at 23 & n.16, have collected (for the convenience of
those doing such research) a list, augmented in this Comment, of federal statutes which
protect employees who report violations from employer retaliation under the following
federal legislation. These statutes include: Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 2
U.S.C. § 1212 (Supp. III 1991) (unlawful employment practices include any intimidation
of, or reprisal against, employees of the Senate by any Member, or an employee of the
Architect of the Capitol by the Architect of the Capitol, because of the employee's exercise
of a right under this Act); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) (providing protection to certain federal employees who disclose
information regarding government mismanagement, fraud, violations or dangers to the
public); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (for
"whistleblowing" civil service employees disclosing agency violations, fraud, gross mis-
management or dangers to the public); Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984,
10 U.S.C. § 1587 (1988) (for disclosures by civilian employees); Department of Defense
Authorization Act of 1987, 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (1988) (for disclosures by employees of de-
fense contractors); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1991) (for commenc-
ing or participating in a proceeding); Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986,
15 U.S.C. § 2651 (1988) (for reporting asbestos in schools); Asbestos School Hazard De-
tection and Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (1988) (for school employees publiciz-
ing an asbestos problem); Jurors' Employment Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878
(1991) (for federal jury service); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988) (for filing or participating in a proceeding); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988) (filing or participation in proceedings); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (for participating in proceed-
ings); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (for filing or par-
ticipating in a proceeding); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1140-1141 (1988) (for providing information or participating in proceedings); Migrant,
Seasonal and Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1991) (for ex-
ercising rights pursuant to § 1855); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 815(c) (1988) (for commencing or participating in proceedings); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293 (1991) (for filing or participation in a proceeding);
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730-3733 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (for employees disclos-
ing false claims or participating in proceedings); Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1991) (for filing or participating in a proceed-
ing); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988) (for commencing or
participating in a proceeding); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300z-10 (1991)
(for refusal to participate in sterilization, abortion or research on religious or moral
grounds); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-309 (1991) (for commencing or par-
ticipating in a proceeding); Equal Employment Opportunity Act [Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964], 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2003 (1988) (for employee opposition and for
participation in proceedings); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(1988) (for participating in proceedings); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971
(1991) (for commencing or participating in a proceeding); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622
(1988) (for participating in proceedings); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1988) (for providing information
or participating in proceedings); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1988)
(for providing information regarding the death or injury of an employee); Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1978, 45 U.S.C. § 441 (a) (1991) (for complaining, participating in a
proceeding, or refusing to work under hazardous conditions); International Safe Contain-
ers Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1991) (for reporting of unsafe containers); Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (1991) (for refusing to operate
an unsafe vehicle, complaining, or participating in a proceeding).
For more information on federal statutes, see DONALD W. BRODIE, INDIVIDUAL EM-
PLOYMENT DispuTrEs: DEFINrrE AND INDEFINrrE TERM CoNTtc'rs 231-40 (1991); Peck,
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not answer questions concerning state common law tort causation, a few
analogies are available, especially if one agrees with the argument that
any retaliatory or whistleblowing cause of action contains an implicit
employer knowledge element of causation which is proven when the re-
taliatory termination itself is proven.1
84
Colorado has a whistleblower statute to protect state employees
who disclose information regarding state agency actions which are not in
the public interest.' 85 This protection does not extend to private em-
ployees. An exception, however, exists when the employer is under con-
tract or agreement with any agency, department or entity of the State of
Colorado.' 8 6 There are, however, a significant number of states which
Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10, at 728-30; Summers, supra note 15, at 11-12.
See also 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:21-26 (May, 1987) (overview of federal whistleblow-
ing statutes).
184. See e.g., Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174, 180 n.4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 990 (1986) (if jury finds that the employee refused to sign what he believed to be a
false affidavit, and the employer knew the information in the affidavit was false, neverthe-
less directing the employee to sign, and then discharges the employee for refusal to sign,
such retaliation "may well be" a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act),
aff'g 573 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (employee asserting a wrongful discharge
cause of action must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer knew it
was requesting the employee to commit perjury or falsification).
See also Oliver v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465 (1987),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 842 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Oliver, the Merit Systems Protection Board held
that to establish a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), the employee must show that:
"(1) a protected disclosure was made; (2) the accused official knew of the claimant's disclo-
sure; (3) the adverse action under review could, under the circumstances, have been retali-
ation; and (4) after careful balancing of the intensity of the accused official's motive against
the gravity of the misconduct, a neus is established between the adverse action and the
motive." Id. at 470 (emphasis added) The board found the "official's knowledge" ele-
ment was satisfied because the employee had repeatedly transmitted memoranda to [the
employer], but the employee failed to establish the required nexus. Id. at 471. Cf Mass v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1530, 1541 (D. Colo. 1992) (in a Title VII case, the
employee failed to prove the two elements of a retaliation claim: (1) that the employee
reported the illegal conduct; and (2) that the employer retaliated; additionally, the em-
ployee's retaliation claim was not "reasonably related" to the discrimination and harass-
ment claims contained in the underlying charge).
185. COLO. REV. STAT §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (1988). See Ward v. Industrial Comm'n,
699 P.2d 960, 967-68 (Colo. 1985) (for Freedom of Speech violations, the Mt. Healthy
"same decision" test is applicable; see supra note 174). See also Indiv. Empl. Rights Manual
(BNA) at 546:5-7 (June, 1991), supra note 93 (other Colorado statutes prohibiting em-
ployer retaliatory discharge).
186. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-114-101 to -103 (1988 & Supp. 1992). A "private enter-
prise under contract with a state agency" is defined as:
[A]ny individual, firm, limited liability company, partnership, joint ven-
ture,corporation, association, or other legal entity which is a party to any type of
state agreement, regardless of what it may be called, for the procurement or dis-
posal of supplies, services, or construction for any department, office, commis-
sion, institution, board, or other agency of state government.
Id. § 24-114-101(4).
An "employee is defined as any person employed by a private enterprise under con-
tract with a state agency. Id. § 24-114-101(3). "Disciplinary action" includes threat of any
such discipline or penalty" (coercion) Id. § 24-114-101 (1). "Disclosure of information" is
defined as written evidence to any person, or testimony before any committee of the gen-
eral assembly regarding acts, omissions, policies, procedures or regulations by a private
enterprise under contract with a state agency "which, if not disclosed, could result in the
waste of public funds, could endanger the public health, safety or welfare, or could other-
wise adversely affect the interests of the state." Id. § 24-114-102(2). No supervisor or
appointing authority of a private enterprise under state contract "shall initiate or adminis-
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have whistleblower statutes protecting private employees. 187 Michigan
is the only state which includes a judicially supplied employer knowl-
edge "element" in a whistleblower statute which is otherwise silent as to
causation.18 8 The employer knowledge element is, however, "simply a
factor to consider in determining the principal question of causa-
tion,"'18 9 It is not a distinct element of a prima facie case, as Colorado,
along with other jurisdictions have recognized. 190
Several states require an employee to bring the alleged violation,
illegality, or unsafe condition to the attention of the employer first, al-
lowing for a reasonable opportunity to correct the situation before the
employee gains the statutory protection. 19 1 New Hampshire allows the
ter any disciplinary action against any employee on account of the employee's disclosure
of information concerning said enterprise." I § 24-114-102(1). Exceptions are provided
where the employee discloses (1) information the employee knows to be false; or (2) infor-
mation which is confidential under any other provision of law. Id. The employee seeking
protection under this statute is obliged to "make a good faith effort" to provide the infor-
mation to be disclosed to the employee's supervisor, appointing authority, or member of
the general assembly prior to disclosure of the information. Id § 12-114-102(2) (emphasis
added). Any aggrieved employee may bring a civil action under this statute in district
court. Id. § 24-114-103. The prevailing employee may recover damages, costs and "such
other relief as [the court] deems appropriate." Id.
It is arguable that had Martin Marietta been under contract in any way with the State
of Colorado, and had this statute been in existence when Lorenz was discharged (CoLo.
REV. STAT. 24-114-101 became effective on July 1988 for acts committed on or after that
date), Lorenz would have been protected under this Colorado "whistleblower" statute,
and he also would have avoided the six-step public policy tort standard set out in Lorenz,
823 P.2d at 109. To date, there is no published Colorado case law construing COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-114-101 to -103.
187. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West
1987 & Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-61 to 378-69 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (West
1988); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 181.932 (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-E:1 to -E:7 (Supp. 1991);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740
(McKinney 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51-4113.53 (Anderson 1991); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 36-15-3 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN.
H 101.595(2), 111.322(2), 111.34(2)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). For a thorough treat-
ment and discussion of state whistleblower statutes and their pros and cons, see Adler &
Daniels, supra note 128, at 55-68 app. A. See generally Martin W. Aron, Whistleblowers, Insub-
ordination, and Employee Rights of Free Speech, 43 LAe. L.J. 211 (1992) (comparing New Jersey
and New York statutes); John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 585 (1992) (detailed analysis of N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740 and suggestions for an
improved "model").
188. Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (West
1981 & Supp. 1992). Section 15.362 of the act states:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an
employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of
the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of
this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public
body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee
is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or in-
quiry held by that public body, or a court action.
189. Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 582 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
190. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109; Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988).
191. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932
(West Supp. 1993); N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (Anderson 1991).
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employee to bypass advising the employer if the employee specifically
believes that such reporting would not result in the employer promptly
remedying the violation.' 9 2 Likewise, New Jersey allows the employee
to forgo disclosure to the employer in an emergency, when the em-
ployee is reasonably certain that the policy or practice is known by one or
more supervisors, or when the employee fears physical harm as a result
of the disclosure.' 9 3 In cases where the employee is required to first
advise the employer to gain later statutory protection, and the employee
does so, the employer knowledge element at common law is patently
satisfied.' 9 4 Thus, a few state whistleblowing statutes provide guidance
towards a conclusion that requiring proof of employer knowledge, as in
Lorenz, is redundant; proving the causation element just by the em-
ployer's retaliatory act will suffice.
Only Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have a compre-
hensive wrongful discharge statute preempting common law actions. 19 5
Montana currently has the most comprehensive legislation in the area of
retaliatory discharge, including retaliation for the employee's refusal to
violate public policy.' 9 6 Lack of good cause and violation of the em-
ployer's own express provisions in its written personnel policies are cov-
ered as well. 19 7 There is no need for a specific chain of causation to be
proven, as all common law remedies are preempted.' 9 8 Discharges for
retaliation for refusing to violate public policy, whistleblowing, and con-
tractual breaches are statutorily covered by a one year statute of limita-
tions, and mutually agreed dispute resolution through arbitration is
provided for procedurally.199 The Virgin Islands Code sets out detailed
definitions of what is "just cause" for discharges; anything else is
deemed to be a wrongful discharge.2 0 0 Likewise, Puerto Rico legislation
contains a list of examples of "good cause." Wrongfully or construc-
tively discharged employees may recover one month's salary plus one
week's salary for each year of service.
20 1
192. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (Supp. 1991).
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
194. Providing the employee, in good faith, advises the employer as to her reasonable
belief that the employer's directed act was unlawful or against common public policy, the
employer may be said to "have notice" or "knowledge" of the employee's point of view.
Ignorance or an adverse employment decision by the employer after this notice may be
described as deliberate, intentional, or at the least, done with obvious knowledge of the
employee's perception of the disputed circumstances. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West
1988 and Supp. 1992); supra note 190-92 and accompanying text.
195. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 10, at 680 n.90 (1992).
196. MoNor. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991).
197. Id. § 39-2-904.
198. Id. § 39-2-913.
199. Id. §§ 39-2-904, 39-2-911, 39-2-914. Proof of fraud or actual malice is necessary
to recover punitive damages. Emotional distress and pain and suffering recoveries are
eliminated. Id. § 39-2-905. For a detailed historical analysis of case law construing Mon-
tana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, see Leonard Bierman & Stuart A.
Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 53 Mowr. L. REV 53 (1992).
200. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 77-79 (Supp. 1987).
201. BRODIE, supra note 183, at 231-32 (describing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185(a)-
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While the Montana, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands statutes do not
provide insight into causation analysis, due to their preemption of com-
mon law wrongful discharge claims, they do offer valuable models of
how future statutory employment law may typically operate. With com-
mon law claims eliminated, as well as "add-on" claims of emotional dis-
tress, interference with contract, etc., the penalty for firing employees in
retaliation for their unwanted lawful behavior may become nothing more
than a minor inconvenience or a "slap-on-the-hand" fine accompanied
with a relatively low dollar figure in back pay. $500,000jury verdicts will
become as ancient a concept as a 50 cent gallon of gas. In effect, this
type of legislation represents an at-will situation, because the employer
no longer has a serious deterrent to prevent retaliatory terminations. It
may also indicate a renewed sense that the average worker is no more




Colorado's pronounced adoption of the public policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine represents a major step forward in pro-
tecting the rights and interests of the public by protecting employees
who have been terminated out of spite or lawfully protected activity, yet
leaves a potential "loophole" in the requirements for evidentiary proof
202. The Model Uiiform Employment-Termination Act, reported in 9A Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 540:21 (Dec. 1991), is also highly controversial. The final version was approved on
August 8, 1991, but a motion to draft the Act as a uniform law, which would have a uni-
form measure introduced in each state legislature was defeated. Id. See also Callahan, supra
note 20, at 516-17 (noting that the Model Law was met with much dissatisfaction from
both the plaintiff and defense groups represented). The Act, which in many ways is similar
to Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, see supra notes 196-99 and ac-
companying text, calls for either severance pay upon termination, or "good cause" to dis-
miss an at-will employee who has been employed by the same employer at least one year.
9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at § 3, 540:32-33. See also id. § 10, 540:42 (prohibiting retaliatory
discharges in connection with protected activity under the Act).
Adoption by state legislators of the Model Uniform Employment Termination Act in
the near future is unlikely. See Randall Samborn, At- Will Doctrine Under Fire; Model Act Di-
vided Employment Bar, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 14, 1991, at 1. Proponents claim the Act will level the
playing field by providing a balance between the extreme of arbitrary dismissal and costly
litigation, thus allowing for a cheap and fast remedy for being fired without just cause, and
also allowing employers to exercise business judgment in good faith in adjusting their
workforce. Other advantages include financial predictability for employers with a poten-
tial for future insurance coverage for claims like that currently found with Workers' Com-
pensation statutes. Opponents complain that mandatory arbitration, damage caps and
preemption of common law tort and contract actions will take much of the motivation away
from plaintiff's attorneys. Further, an easily insurable risk may be viewed apathetically by
the employer, and the judicial systems within a state may become flooded with claims. See
generally Kempf & Taylor, supra note 15 (proposing their own version of a Model Termina-
tion Act, similar in many respects to Montana's); Glenn D. Newman, The Model Employment
Termination Act in the United States: Lessons from the British Experience with Uniform Protections
Against Unfair Dismissal, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 393 (1990) (commentary and criticism of the
Model Uniform Employment Termination Act, and an insightful comparison with the
U.K.'s Employee Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978); 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Dis-
charge § 10, at 680-81 (1992).
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of the employer's bad conduct. 20 3 The lack of precise language in Lorenz
may be an indication that the Colorado Supreme Court wishes to retain
an equally balanced test for determining whether a prima fade case has
been met by the employee, allowing for case by case interpretations
which are particularly fact driven.
2 ° 4
An at-will employee in Colorado supposedly now has protection
from being terminated for refusing to violate specific laws for an em-
ployer, or for being denied the rights and privileges that come with citi-
zenship or the job itself. The complication in this "pro-plaintiff"
decision, is that the employee is now theoretically farther away from es-
tablishing a primafacie case then was the employee previous to this deci-
sion. While the standard expressed in Lorenz20 5 is carefully worded so
as to potentially include yet untried fact patterns, the Cronk I standard 20 6
was a "cleaner," more well-defined standard that carried a certain de-
gree of predictability in the law.
On the other hand, it seems more likely that the employer knowl-
edge element will be easily proven when the motive for the employee's
discharge is proven to be retaliatory. This is due to the theory that once
the retaliatory act itself is proven, the employer knowledge element has
been implicitly proven as well. If Colorado appellate courts accept the
argument that distinctions in wrongful discharge, public policy and
whistleblower terminology are unnecessary because they are all forms of
retaliatory discharge, the inevitable result would be agreement with the
proposition that the employer knowledge element is implicitly proven,
notwithstanding other evidence presented, whenever a retaliatory dis-
charge itself is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the
employer knowledge element is unnecessary in proving causation in a
retaliatory discharge because when a retaliatory discharge occurs, and
the reason for the employer's retaliation can be traced and proven, then
the employer either should have known, or must have known of the em-
ployee's act or refusal to act which prompted the employer's retaliation.
203. Namely, the uncertainty of how the Lorenz employer knowledge element must be
satisfied.
204. COLO. CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS 3d §§ 31:9 & 31:10 (Cur. Supp. 1993) follow the
Lorenz decision requiring the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the
elements set out in Lorenz including that the "defendant was aware or reasonably should
have been aware, that plaintiff's refusal to comply with the defendant's directive was based
on plaintiff's reasonable belief that to do so would have been (illegal) (contrary to plain-
tiff's duty as a citizen) (a violation of plaintiff's legal right or privilege as a worker)." Id.
§ 39:9. The Notes on Use for §§ 31:9 & 31:10 indicate, however, that "it is not clear
whether the requirements set forth in Lorenz were intended to apply to a situation in which
an employer discharges an employee for exercising a specific statutory right or duty with-
out any prior order or directive not to do so." Id. at 264.
The author wishes to thank the Hon. Charles Pierce, Colorado Court of Appeals, and
his staff, for the opportunity to inspect and copy these jury instructions and accompanying
notes in the "working-manuscript" form. Judge Pierce is on the Colorado Supreme Court
Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil. Thanks are also extended to Robert
Truhlar, Esq., of Truhlar & Truhlar, Denver, Colorado, for advice regarding the existence
of these recently proposed and adopted jury instructions.
205. Lorenz, 823 P.2d. at 109.
206. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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In such a situation, the employer's knowledge, whether actual or con-
structive, must be present or the discharge would not be retaliatory in
nature. Once the first five prima facie elements in Lorenz are satisfied,
then the sixth element of required employer knowledge is also proven
by implication. Should the courts in Colorado, however, continue to
maintain that the employer knowledge element is both required and im-
portant, then the courts should construe this element liberally on mo-
tions for summary judgment, and allow the jury to make this combined
factual and legal decision.
Another potential solution lies in the chambers of the Colorado
Legislature. Other states and territories have enacted legislation to pro-
tect non-unionized employees from wrongful discharge by describing
the definition of what is either "good cause" or "bad cause," and pro-
viding remedies for discharges without good cause, as well as remedies
for whistleblowing.2 0 7 Since the Lorenz court has not provided a predict-
able standard or solution to the public-policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine, it would be in the best interests of public policy and
the tax-paying voters of Colorado, for the legislature to thoroughly ad-
dress this issue, but not necessarily by following the examples of Mon-
tana or the Model Employment Termination Act. Legislation may
provide a workable long-term answer. Careful consideration, however,
will be necessary to draft a statute with the deterrence factor equal to
that of an unpredictable jury verdict.
Michael D. Wulfsohn
207. See supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
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